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INTRODUCTION
"There's nothing left," Linda Lay, wife of Enron CEO Kenneth
Lay, claimed in an appearance on NBC's Today show while wearing a
$15,000 Cartier watch and living in an $8 million penthouse.' Mean-
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law; J.D., Rutgers
School of Law, Camden; LL.M., New York University. The author would like to thank
Professors Alice Abreu, Adam Rosenzwieg, Jason Gilmer, James McGrath, Mark Burge, Aric
Short, and Frank Snyder and Craig Gottilla, Esq. for their comments on earlier drafts of this
article and Scott Omo, Evangeline Myrick, and Amanda Barlow for their invaluable research
assistance.
1 Daniel Eisenberg, Is Ken Lay a Victim Too?, TIMECOM, Feb. 3, 2002, http://www.
time.contime/magazine/article/0,9171,198880,00.html; The Today Show; Interview of Linda
Lay (NBC television broadcast Jan. 28, 2002).
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while, average employees at Enron struggled to figure out what to do
now that they were unemployed with no retirement savings, college sav-
ings for their children, or severance pay. 2 To these employees, Linda
Lay's claim of financial ruin must have been insulting.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the public began to protest the large com-
pensation packages executives were receiving. 3 Average workers were
struggling 4 while executives got raises, even as the corporations they
worked for failed. 5 This disconnect between executive compensation
and executive performance led Congress to attempt to curtail executive
compensation. 6 This article will examine the Congress's attempt to tem-
per the amount of compensation through the tax code. These tax code
provisions enacted by Congress to restrain excessive executive compen-
sation in fact had the effect of increasing compensation for certain execu-
tives at a great cost to stockholders. In 1980, the average CEO made 42
times the average hourly worker's pay. 7 By 1990, the average CEO
made 107 times the average hourly worker's pay.8 In 1993, Congress
enacted tax legislation intended to rein in excessive executive compensa-
tion.9 However, in 2000, the average CEO made 525 times the average
2 Matthew Scott, What Investors Can Learn from the Enron Mess, 32-9 BLACK ENTER-
PRISE, Apr. 30, 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articIes/mim 1365/is_9_32/ai_8421
2988; Daniel Ruth, How's It Gonna End, Ken and Linda? Paul Might Know, TAMPA TRIa.,
Feb. 8, 2002, at 2.
3 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877;
Ceiling Is Urged on Spiraling Pay of Top Managers, Cm. TRIB., Dec. 17, 1989, at C 1; Richard
Cohen, Editorial, Executives' Salaries Are Way out of Line, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Dec.
26, 1991, at 3E; Karen Tumulty, Corporate Exec Salaries Becoming Political Issue, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, Jan. 1, 1992, at 6; see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GEN-
ERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at
199-200 (Comm. Print 1984) (explaining Congress's disallowance of "excess parachute
payment[s]").
4 See Steve Lohr, Recession Puts a Harsh Spotlight on Hefty Pay of Top Executives,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al.
5 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 877; John Doyle,
SEC Rules to Give Shareholders Say in Executive Pay, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Oct. 16, 1992, at
1, available at http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=1992_1087350; SEC
Strikes Blow for Shareholder Rights Execs' Pay Must Be Disclosed, REC. N.J., Oct. 16, 1992,
at bOl.
6 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 877.
7 AFL-CIO, 2006 Trends in CEO Pay, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/paywatch/
pay/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) [hereinafter AFL-CIO, Trends]; see Monica Soto &
Bradley Meacham, Shareholders Take Aim at Lofty CEO Pay Executive Compensation
Largely Escapes Belt-Tightening Even when Profits Sink, SEATTLE TIMES, June 8, 2003, at
N12; You Bought, They Sold, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64.
8 AFL-CIO, Trends, supra note 7; see Soto & Meacham, supra note 7, at N12; You
Bought, They Sold, FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64.
9 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,211, 107 Stat.
416, 469 (1993) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2007)).
TAXING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
hourly worker's pay.' 0 Compensation amounts that executives receive
since the enactment of the tax provisions are increasing dramatically, not
decreasing. "
Some commentators have argued that executive compensation
amounts are reasonable because the amounts reflect what the market de-
mands, and as a result, "measures to 'rein-in' executive compensation are
ill-advised and possibly counter-productive."' 12 Courts have held that the
actual amount of compensation does not itself render the compensation
unreasonable.' 3 In enacting § 162(m), 14 Congress expressed its view
that compensation was excessive if the executive's compensation was
not adequately tied to the corporation's performance.' 5 The purpose of
this article is not to enter the debate about whether or not executive com-
pensation is excessive; numerous articles and books have been written on
that topic. This article is intended to examine Congress's ultimately un-
successful attempt to curtail excessive executive compensation through
the tax code. Whether Congress's legislative purpose was sound or mis-
guided, these statutes clearly failed to achieve their purpose. The solu-
tions proposed in this article are intended to address the failings in the
various pieces of tax legislation that have been enacted to address exces-
sive executive compensation.
Congress believed that linking performance and compensation
would adequately address excessive compensation amounts. 16 Stock
prices are one indicator of how a corporation is performing, and Con-
gress accordingly enacted tax provisions linking executive compensation
to stock performance. 17 The tax provisions sought to convert cash com-
pensation to stock options because it was thought that doing so would
10 See AFL-CIO, Trends, supra note 7; see News in Brief, PERSONNEL TODAY, Jan. 1,
2005, at I; Jeanne Sahadi, CEO Pay: 364 Times More than Workers, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug.
29, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/28/news/economy/ceo-pay-workers/index.htm.
I See Sahadi, supra note 10 (showing a decrease in the ratio of average CEO pay to
average worker pay from 2000 to 2005 but a 9.4% increase in average CEO pay between 2005
and 2006).
12 Mark J. Loewenstein, The Conundrum of Executive Compensation, 35 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) [hereinafter Loewenstein, The Conundrum].
13 See Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 292 (1929); William S.
Gray & Co. v. United States, 35 F.2d 968, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1929).
14 Hereinafter, all references to "sections" are to the respective sections in the Internal
Revenue Code (West 2007).
15 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-11 , at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877
("[E]xcessive compensation will be reduced if the deduction for compensation (other than
performance-based compensation) paid to the top executives of publicly-held corporations is
limited to $1 million per year.").
16 See Executive Compensation: Hearing on S.2298, H.R. 4727 and H.R. 5260 Before the
Subcomm. on Taxation of the S. Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong. 2 (1992) (statement of Sen.
David L. Boren, Member, S. Comm. on Finance) ("[W]e would be less concerned about the
amount of compensation paid to executives if we believed that pay tracked performance.").
17 See H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 648-49, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 879-80.
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align the interests of executives and shareholders by making executives
vested owners in the corporation as well.' 8 The unintended result was to
encourage corporate fraud and accounting misrepresentations intended to
inflate earnings and bring executives higher salaries.
The three most important tax code provisions designed to contain or
regulate excessive compensation are §§ 162, 162(m) and 280G. Section
162 allows businesses to deduct for compensation paid so long as it is
reasonable. 19 This section is rarely, if ever, used to limit compensa-
tion.20 Instead, it is used to re-characterize compensation amounts as
other items, such as gifts or dividends.2' Section 162(m) limits the de-
duction for executive compensation to $1 million unless the compensa-
tion is tied to the performance of either the corporation or the
executive.22 Section 280G denies deductions for excessive amounts paid
to certain executives in the event of a change in control in the corpora-
tion.23 None of these sections work as they were intended. 24 On the
contrary, they have resulted in even larger amounts of compensation
amounts paid to executives at greater cost to shareholders. 25
This article will seek to demonstrate that the effects of these tax
code provisions are in direct conflict with their intended purpose. Part I
of this article describes the controversy surrounding excessive executive
compensation that gave rise to tax legislation and current proposals to
further rein in executive compensation through the tax code. Part II con-
siders §§ 162, 162(m) and 280G of the tax code and their effects on
excessive executive compensation and on income and wealth disparity.
Part III examines the overall impact of these various code provisions on
excessive executive compensation and will suggest several solutions for
reducing excessive executive compensation.
18 See Steven Bank, Devaluing Reform: The Derivatives Market and Executive Compen-
sation, 7 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 301, 302, 305 (1995).
19 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2007).
20 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACK-
GROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (Comm. Print 2006) [hereinafter 109TH
CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION]; E.L. Kellett, Annotation, Reasonableness of Compensa-
tion Paid to Officers or Employees, so as to Warrant Deduction Thereof in Computing Em-
ployer's Income Tax, 10 A.L.R. 3d 125 § 3 (2006) [hereinafter Kellett, Compensation].
21 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6; Kellett, Compensa-
tion, supra note 20, at § 3.
22 I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(1), (m)(4)(C).
23 I.R.C. § 280G(a)-(b).
24 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 7.
25 See id.
TAXING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
I. THE DEBATE OVER EXCESSIVE
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Executives are often presented with a variety of pay packages. A
"golden hello" payment is a large upfront hiring bonus intended to com-
pensate the executive for any bonuses, stock options, pensions, and other
compensation that the executive is giving up by leaving his former em-
ployer.26 After a "golden hello" payment, the executive is paid his base
cash compensation. Many executives are paid little in base cash com-
pensation in comparison to their overall compensation packages. 27 This
lower base cash compensation may be viewed as a public relations tech-
nique-an attempt to make the shareholders feel the executive is looking
out only for the corporation's best interest. In many cases, however, the
executive will receive bonuses in the form of cash, stock, or stock op-
tions in addition to base compensation. These bonuses often represent
the majority of the total compensation package. 28 Next, the executive
will typically receive a pension or other deferred compensation arrange-
ment. Finally, two types of exit payments often exist. "Golden para-
chute" payments are made in the event that the company merges or is
purchased and the new owner does not plan to keep the executive.2 9
Severance packages are paid in the event that the executive is terminated.
Many of these compensation packages can run into the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars and many are not in the best interest of shareholders.
Median pay of a chief executive officer in 1992 was $2.3 million.30
The average CEO in an S&P 500 company made $15.06 million in 2006;
this was a 11.05% increase over 2005 pay. 3' The average workers pay
increased by 1.1% in 2006.32 Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan described the excessive compensation paid to executives as
26 See, e.g., Ben White, HP Giving Hurd $20 Million "Golden Hello," WASH. POST,
Mar. 31, 2005, at El.
27 For example, in 2005 Google's two CEOs were paid $1 in salary but received $1.5
billion and $1.45 billion from stock sales respectively, and the CEO of Kinder Morgan was
paid $1 in salary and received $72 million. Michael Brush, CEOs for $1 a Year-Plus Mil-
lions More, MSN MONEY, Feb. 1, 2006, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P143257.asp.
28 Moira Herbst, The Elite Circle of $1 CEOs, Apple's Steve Jobs and Google's Eric
Schmidt Are Just Two of the CEOs Who Work for a Buck. Why Do Top Executives Give up
Their Salaries?, BUSINESS WEEK ONLINE, Sept. 17, 2007, http://www.businessweek.com/man-
aging/content/sep2007/ca20070914_637253.htm?campaignid=rssnull.
29 See I.R.C. § 280G (West 2007).
30 See Kevin Murphy, Erplaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 847, 847 (2002).
31 See AFL-CIO, Trends, supra note 7.
32 Lynn Brenner, How Did You Do?, PARADE.COM, Apr. 15, 2007, http://www.parade.
com/articles/editions/2007/edition_04-15-2007/WPElead.
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"infectious greed."' 33 He further commented that "[u]nnecessarily high
executive compensation can also be a misallocation of resources and a
drain on the economy. 34
The debate over executive compensation and whether or not it is
excessive is not new. The debate reignites every few years and results in
legislative acts aimed at reining in perceived excessive compensation. 35
Commentators have argued that if shareholders were better-informed and
the compensation amounts were adequately disclosed to shareholders,
shareholders would exert their influence to keep executive compensation
levels in check. 36 Still others have argued that the issue of excessive
executive compensation should be addressed at the board of director
level by compensating the board with stock, thus making them less be-
holden to management and more invested in the efficiency of the
corporation. 37
Some commentators have proposed addressing the issue of compen-
sation from the perspective of the "rank and file workers" at corpora-
tions.38 Some proposals would tie executive compensation to the
average worker's salary. 39 For example, a proposal was made to limit
33 Testimony of Alan Greenspan Before the S. Comm. on 'Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 107th Cong. (July 16, 2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july/
testimony.htm.
34 Joshua A. Kreinberg, Note, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensation in Attempts
to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138, 145 (1995).
35 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312,
(1993) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2007)); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, (1984) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999); Small
Business and Work Opportunity Act of 2007, S. 349, 1 10th Cong. (2007) (proposing a cap on
deferred compensation payments similar to that found in § 162(m)); JOINT COMMITTEE ON
TAXATION, I tOTH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIRMAN'S MODIFICATION OF THE PROVI-
SIONS OF THE "SMALL BUSINESS AND WORK OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 2007," at 25 (Comm. Print
2007); see also Income Equity Act of 1999, H.R. 740, 106th Cong. (1999) (proposing a limita-
tion on a corporation's deduction of executive compensation up to twenty-five times the low-
est paid employee in the corporation); Income Disparities Act of 1991, H.R. 3056, 102d Cong.
(1991) (same).
36 See James A. Cotton, Toward Fairness in Compensation of Management and Labor:
Compensation Ratios, a Proposal for Disclosure, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157, 179 (1997) (pro-
posing that corporations disclose to their shareholders the ratio between their average em-
ployee's compensation and their top executives' compensation).
37 See Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board Based Solution, 34
B.C. L. REV. 937, 942-44 (1993).
38 See Gerald P. Buccino, Shareholder Uprising: Is It SOX, or Are They Simply Fed Up?,
24-5 Amer. Bankr. Inst. J. 30, 30 (2005) (noting that shareholders at Merrill Lynch & Co.,
Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co., Lockheed Martin Corp., International Paper, and Marsh &
McLennan Cos. have voted on a proposal to limit chief executive officer pay to one hundred
times the average compensation paid to non-managerial workers in the prior year); Cotton,
supra note 36, at 179 (arguing for disclosure in proxy statements to shareholders of the ratio of
executive pay to the average employees in the company); Susan J. Stabile, One for A, Two for
B, and Four Hundred for C: The Widening Gap in Pay Between Executives and Rank and File
Employees, U. Mich. L.J. Reform 115, 156-57 (2002); see also H.R. 740; H.R. 3056.
39 See Cotton, supra note 36, at 179; Stabile, supra note 38, at 156-57.
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executive compensation to twenty-five times what the average worker is
paid.40 The CEO of Costco, James Sinegal, earns $558,000 a year and
believes that paying a CEO ten to twelve times the highest hourly rate is
fair.4 1
Shareholders should profit from an increase in stock price and exec-
utives should profit from performing well. The performance of an exec-
utive, however, may or may not be reflected in an increase in stock price.
The assumption that if stock price goes up the executives should be com-
pensated at a higher rate does not appear to have any merit. Several
studies and law review articles have noted that a tie between higher
levels of performance and stock options may not exist.4 2
By 2001, almost 52% of families held stock, either directly or
through plans such as mutual funds and 401(k)s.4 3 If the wealth of cor-
porations was distributed to the shareholders, rather than to the execu-
tives, this would be more consistent with congressional intent to reduce
excessive executive compensation and provide greater returns to
shareholders. 44
Shareholders at many corporations appear to be frustrated by the
levels of executive compensation and many are pushing for a change. In
2005, shareholders of several corporations raised issues relating to exec-
utive compensation that they wanted addressed and wanted the right to
vote on. For example, shareholders voted on proposals to limit executive
compensation to the amount that would be deductible at Merck & Co.
Inc., Bank of New York, Honeywell International, Inc., Citigroup Inc.
(excluding the chief executive officer), Motorola Inc., Colgate-Palmolive
Company, and The Home Depot USA Inc.4 5 Other shareholders have
voted on proposals to limit CEO compensation to 100 times the average
compensation paid to non-managerial workers in the prior year, to sepa-
rate the chairman of the board position from the CEO position, to curb
excessive compensation, and to require the compensation committee of
the corporation to review executive compensation. 46
40 See H.R. 740; H.R. 3056.
41 See Michael Brush, Extravagant CEO Pay Is Back, MSN MONEY, Mar. 15, 2005,
http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P 110762.asp.
42 See Kevin Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS
2485, 2539 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Cards eds., 1999) (stating "there is surprisingly little
direct evidence that higher pay-performance sensitivities lead to higher stock performance.").
43 See Barbara Hagenbaugh, Nation's Wealth Disparity Widens, USA TODAY, Jan. 22,
2003, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/fed/2003-01-22-house
hold-study x.htm.
44 James Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management-Shareholder Inter-
ests, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 697, 700 (1997).
45 See Buccino, supra note 38, at 30.
46 Such proposals were made at Merck & Co., Honeywell International, Inc., The Boeing
Company, Pfizer Inc., Citigroup Inc., Wells Fargo & Co., Bristol Meyers Squibb Co., Lock-
heed Martin Corp., Marsh & McLennan Cos., and Amgen Inc. Id.
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High levels of executive compensation may also interfere with the
best interests of corporations and shareholders by preventing the enact-
ment of tax legislation that might reduce corporate tax rates. One United
States Senator noted that "we open the paper and see huge compensation
packages, $200 million; $400 million as a walk away .... The fallout of
some of those makes it very difficult for us to say let us reduce rates."
47
The political climate and the public's discouragement with the excessive
amounts of compensation hinder legislative action that could benefit cor-
porations and shareholders.
Commentators often characterize the public complaints about exces-
sive executive compensation as "populist" complaints from employees
whose industries have become obsolete or by workers who are suffering
losses.48 Complaints that compensation packages paid to executives are
unjust should not be dismissed as complaints by workers who have fallen
on hard times. The frequency of such complaints makes it critical to
consider the possibility that the injustice is real. In fact, in response to
requirements that corporations report stock option grants to executives
on their financial statements, corporations have begun to examine the
transfer of wealth from shareholders to executives through stock op-
tions.49 As one consultant noted, boards have been calculating the "sheer
47 Corporate Tax Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th
Cong. 109 (2006) (statement of Sen. Mark Foley, Member, House Comm. on Ways and
Means).
48 See Kevin Murphy, Politics, Economics and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L.
REV. 713, 713 (1995) (quoting Thomas McCarroll, The Shareholders Strike Back: Executive
Pay, TIME, May 4, 1992, at 46). Murphy also states:
Recognizing the populist attack on wealth as a response to inevitable wealth redistri-
butions adds perspective to the political forces underlying the pay controversy.
Workers in obsolete sectors suffer from technological growth while those earning
union wages suffer from increasing non-unionized domestic and global competition.
Even workers who remain employed in established industries experience real losses
in their human capital and future promotion prospects. It is both predicable and
understandable that the collective frustration of these workers will be vented as an
attack on the highly paid CEOs and others perceived to be benefiting from the eco-
nomic turmoil.
Id. at 717. Characterizing the public's complaints on wealth disparity as complaints from
"workers in obsolete sectors" is unfair. Workers are not complaining simply because they are
in obsolete sectors or have suffered a loss in human capital, but rather because the overall
disparity in wealth continues to grow. The vast amount of wealth disparity is not only unfair
but bad public policy. It is a threat to democracy in that it creates a plutocracy. See Stabile,
supra note 38, at 154 (stating that "[iut is leading toward the transformation of the United
States from a middle-class democracy into something that more closely resembles an authori-
tarian quasi-DEMOCRACY with an overclass, an underclass, and a hidden politics driven by
money." (quoting JAMES K. GALBRAITH, CREATED UNEQUAL: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN PAY 6
(1998)).
49 See Oversight Hearing on Expensing Stock Options: Supporting and Strengthening the
Independence of The Financial Accounting Standards Board: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Financial Management, the Budget, and Int'l Security of the S. Comm. on Governmental
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size of this wealth transfer. In many cases, the findings have been a
shocking but necessary eye-opener for the board." 50
II. THE TAX PROVISIONS THAT SEEK TO REGULATE
EXCESSIVE COMPENSATION
A. SECTION 162
Section 162 allows corporations to deduct a "reasonable allowance"
for compensation.51 Determining whether compensation is reasonable is
a question of fact based on the circumstances surrounding the compensa-
tion amount. 52 The term "reasonable allowance" is not defined by the
tax code or the Treasury regulations. 53 To be deductible, the compensa-
tion amount must be "ordinary and necessary." 54
The amendment providing a deduction for a "reasonable allowance"
for compensation was added in 1918, but the legislative history does not
reveal the congressional intent behind the clause's enactment.55 Com-
mentary implies that Congress added the amendment to § 162 in order to
specifically include a provision in the statute allowing a compensation
deduction to ensure that businesses would not hesitate to take the deduc-
tion.56 The theory was that corporations had been uncomfortable taking
such a deduction because they were unsure whether such a deduction for
compensation was really permitted.57 Congress added § 162 to reduce
fear among corporations that courts or the Treasury Department would
challenge their deductions. 58
The Treasury regulations under § 162 provide that salaries are sub-
ject to careful analysis and that if they are out of proportion to the vol-
ume of the business or are excessive when compared to the salaries of
like officers or employees of similar corporations the excess amount is
not deductible. 59 Courts are to analyze the reasonableness of the com-
Affairs, 108th Cong. 102 (2004) (written testimony of Donald P. Delves, President, The Delves
Group) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing].
50 See id.
51 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 2007).
52 See Long Island Drug Co., Inc., v. Comm'r, II1 F.2d 593, 594 (2d Cir. 1940); Wagner
& Son v. Comm'r, 93 F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1937).
53 See I.R.C. § 162(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7 (1960).
54 I.R.C. § 162(a).
55 See S. REP. No. 65-617 (1918).
56 See Erwin Griswold, New Light on "A Reasonable Allowance for Salaries," 59 HARV.
L. REV. 286, 288 (1945) (stating that the language in then § 234(a)(I) of the Revenue Act of
1918 was intended to be liberalizing language rather than a restriction on the deduction of
executive compensation).
57 See id. at 287.
58 See id. at 290.
59 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(3) (1960).
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pensation paid to an executive on a case by case basis. 60 However,
courts have not applied the reasonableness standard to limit the amount
of compensation. Rather, they have applied the standard primarily to
limit payments by closely held companies where those companies have
tried to disguise nondeductible dividends as compensation which would
be deductible. 6'
A deduction for compensation under § 162 will be permitted if the
compensation is an ordinary and necessary expense. 62 Furthermore, if
the deduction is for a "reasonable allowance" of salary, the amount of
that compensation must be reasonable. 63 In most cases compensation for
an executive is a necessary business expense because almost all corpora-
tions must pay compensation to their employees, including executives.
The deductibility of the compensation therefore really hinges on whether
a court will consider the amount reasonable.
No uniform test exists to determine if compensation is reasonable or
if the amounts are ordinary and necessary. In trying to make such deter-
minations, courts have used an assortment of factors, according a certain
amount of weight to each factor. 64 The lack of a precise rule, a consis-
tent list of factors, or guidance on how to weigh each factor have led to
confusion over whether compensation amounts are reasonable. 65
In Mayson Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, the Sixth Circuit
listed nine factors used to evaluate whether compensation was deducti-
ble. While courts may use variations on the factors or weigh them differ-
ently, the factors laid out in Mayson frequently form the basis for the
analysis. 66
The nine factors that the Sixth Circuit set out in Mayson were: (1)
the employee's qualifications for the job; (2) the nature, scope and extent
of work actually performed by the employee; (3) the size and complexity
of the business enterprise; (4) the economic conditions and background
of the industry involved; (5) the particular company's dividend history;
60 Kellett, Compensation, supra note 20, at §§ 2-3.
61 H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877;
109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
62 I.R.C. § 162(a) (West 2007).
63 I.R.C. § 162(a)(1).
64 Kellett, Compensation, supra note 20, at § 3.
65 Compare Denison Poultry & Egg Co. v. United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
P9360 (1982) (holding that the compensation was reasonable and therefore deductible), with
Clymer v. Comm'r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1576 (1984) (holding that the compensation was not
reasonable or deductible).
66 See Mayson Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949); see also Dexsil
Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 96, 100 (2d Cir. 1998); Rutter v. Comm'r, 853 F.2d 1267, 1271
(5th Cir. 1988) (citing the Mayson factors); Automatic Cigarette Sales Corp. v. Comm'r, 234
F.2d 825, 827 (4th Cir. 1956); Dick Bros. v. Comm'r, 205 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1953) (citing
Mayson but not explicitly listing the factors).
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(6) a comparison of the compensation paid with the compensation paid to
other similarly situated employees at similar businesses of the same size;
(7) the compensation being paid to the company's other employees; (8)
the amount of compensation that the employee received in prior years;
and (9) a comparison of compensation amounts to distributions made to
shareholders. 67 Other courts have added additional factors, such as the
financial condition of the corporation, to determine whether compensa-
tion paid to an executive was reasonable. 68 Moreover, no single factor is
determinative. Rather, a court must weigh the factors against one an-
other to determine if the compensation is reasonable. 69
The Internal Revenue Service Manual lays out twelve factors that an
agent should use when evaluating whether compensation is reasonable.
They include (1) the nature of the employee's duties; (2) the background
and experience of the employee; (3) the employee's knowledge of the
business; (4) the business's size; (5) the employee's contribution to profit
making; (6) the time devoted by the employee; (7) the general economic
conditions; (8) the economic conditions locally; (9) the character and
amount of responsibility of the employee; (10) the time of year when
compensation is determined; (11) whether the compensation is really a
payment for a business or for assets acquired; and (12) a comparison of
similarly situated employees in similar businesses of the same size.70
Again, no one factor is determinative; all the factors must be weighed
against one another to determine if the compensation is reasonable. 71
Later courts developed an independent investor test. Under this test
compensation was reasonable and therefore deductible if an independent
investor, evaluating all of the relevant factors, believed that the compen-
sation was fair.72
67 Mayson, 178 F.2d at 119.
68 See Austin v. United States, 28 F.2d 677, 678 (5th Cir. 1928); Brown-Forman Distill-
ers Corp. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 711, 716-17 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Herff Motor Co. v.
McCabe, 41 F. Supp. 1011, 1013 (M.D. Tenn. 1939), affd sub non Nashville Trust Co. v.
Herff Motor Co., 122 F.2d 1022 (6th Cir. 1941); see also Foos v. Comm'r, 41 T.C.M. (CCH)
863, 878-79 (1981) (listing twenty-one different factors used to determine if compensation
was reasonable). But see Heywood Boot & Shoe Co. v. Comm'r, 76 F.2d 586, 588 (1st Cir.
1935) (stating that, although the executives were shareholders, they were not trying to hide a
distribution of corporate profits as compensation); Ox Fibre Brush Co. v. Blair, 32 F.2d 42, 48
(4th Cir. 1929), aff'd sub noin Lucas v. Ox Fibre Brush Co., 281 U.S. 115 (1930) (choosing
not to compare compensation amounts to the value of the outstanding capital stock).
69 Irby Constr. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d 824, 826 (Ct. Cl. 1961); see also Miller
Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r, 149 F.2d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 1945).
70 I.R.S. Manual 4.35.2.5.2.2 (May 5, 2006).
71 See Irby, 290 F.2d at 827.
72 Exacto Spring Corp. v. Comm'r, 196 F.3d 833, 838 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
executive's compensation was reasonable because investor would get a twenty percent return
after its payment to the executive which was higher than the 13% return the government had
stated that investors would have expected); see also Dexsil Corp. v. Comm'r, 147 F.3d 96,
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Comparison with the compensation amounts received by other simi-
larly situated executives is a very important factor that is often used to
determine whether compensation amounts are reasonable. 73 This is par-
ticularly true because it is one of the factors specifically addressed in the
Treasury regulations. The regulations compare compensation amounts
for similar services at like businesses as one of the factors to determine if
compensation is reasonable. 74 Courts may also compare an executive's
compensation to that of workers at the same corporation. 75
Because executive salaries have become so uniformly high, it ap-
pears unlikely that many of the high levels of compensation will be
deemed unreasonable under § 162 when compared to other executive sal-
aries.76 Boards of directors frequently evaluate what other executives are
being paid when determining the salary for the executives in their corpo-
ration.77 In fact, "as a practical matter, boards and compensation com-
mittees cannot set pay without regard to the pay of executives in
comparable firms." 78 Because the going rate for an executive can often
run into the millions, tens of millions, or, in some cases, hundreds of
millions of dollars, even extremely high salaries will be reasonable in
comparison to the salaries of similarly-situated executives under § 162.79
Courts will not consider a compensation package unreasonable
based on its size alone.80 If a compensation amount or portion of com-
pensation paid is deemed unreasonable, then it will not be deductible to
the corporation. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) or the courts will
leave such compensation as non-deductible unreasonable compensation
and will not re-characterize it as another type of corporate expense unless
the facts support such re-determination. 81 If the IRS determines that an
100-01 (2d Cir. 1998) (describing the "independent investor" test); Elliotts, Inc. v. Comm'r,
716 F.2d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 1983).
73 See Kellett, Compensation, supra note 20, at § 8; see also Botany Worsted Mills v.
United States, 278 U.S. 282, 290-92 (1929) (holding that the executive's compensation was
not reasonable but noting that paying the executives through profits in the corporation was
typical of similar companies in the same industry).
7, See, e.g., Botany Worstead Mills, 278 U.S. at 290-92.
75 See United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1942); Pinkham Medicine Co. v.
Comm'r, 128 F.2d 986, 989 (1st Cir. 1942).
76 Comparison with the compensation of other executives is one of the factors to deter-
mine reasonable compensation. See Kellett, Compensation, supra note 20, at § 8. Because
compensation amounts have increased, when a comparison of similarly situated executives is
made, the amounts will be increased in line with the higher amounts that other executives are
receiving, even if those amounts are exceedingly high.
77 Loewenstein, The Conundrum, supra note 12, at 8.
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 William S. Gray & Co. v. United States, 35 F.2d 968, 974 (Ct. Cl. 1929).
81 Sterno Sales Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 552, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
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amount of compensation is unreasonable, then the burden is on the tax-
payer to show that the compensation was reasonable. 82
Corporations often pay executives the most cost-effective amount
for the results the corporation expects from the executive. 83 Courts
should apply a multi-factorial test when determining whether compensa-
tion is reasonable because each business has its own unique circum-
stances and job requirements for an executive. Comparisons to
similarly-situated executives should be a critical factor, as should the in-
dividual performance of the executive and the ultimate results to the cor-
poration. The test should be based on a cost-benefit analysis. Perhaps
the skill set that the executive brings to the table merits a large amount of
compensation. The IRS must, however, be suspicious of large compen-
sation amounts when they deviate from the standard comparable
amounts. The IRS must evaluate whether the compensation amounts are
indeed reasonable when examining the skills of the executive. The inde-
pendent investor test will be critical in this respect.
Until now, the enforcement of reasonable compensation has focused
on recharacterizing the compensation as dividends, gifts, or other types
of corporate payment.84 Section 162 (a)(1) lays out all of the rules nec-
essary to ensure that boards of directors and executives who seek to pay
unjustified amounts of compensation do not exploit their shareholders
and corporations. The courts must test for "reasonableness" to determine
both when compensation amounts are too low and also when compensa-
tion amounts are too high. Congress decided to act when it found that
courts were not applying the reasonableness test to find compensation
excessive. 85 Congress enacted § 162(m) to further define what it deemed
to be reasonable compensation paid by a corporation.
82 See Perlmutter v. Comm'r, 44 T.C. 276, 289 (1965).
83 See In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693, 746 n.402 (citing Sean Griffith, Good Faith
Business Judgment: A Theory in Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DuKE L.J. 1
(2005)).
84 See Kellett, Compensation, supra note 20, at § 3 (stating, "While it is true that com-
pensation must meet the test of reasonableness regardless of whether or not the employee is a
stockholder of the corporate employer, as a practical matter the compensation of a nonstock-
holder and unrelated employee is rarely challenged, since the fact that the salary or compensa-
tion is set by arm's-length negotiations ordinarily establishes its reasonableness, and it is only
in the rare instances where the salary paid an unrelated employee is completely out of line with
any standards of reasonableness that the compensation will be challenged."); see also H.R.
REP. No. 103-111, at 646 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877; 109TH CONG.,
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
85 See infra Part H.B.I.
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B. SECTION 162(m)
1. The Reasons Behind § 162(m)
Congress enacted § 162(m) to rein in excessive executive compen-
sation. Two things happened in reaction to the provision. Corporations
changed their behavior, and in many cases stock options became the pri-
mary form of executive compensation, increasing the amounts of pay.
Also, some corporations ignored the limitations imposed by § 162(m).
The costs of both of these results were ultimately borne by shareholders.
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, a consensus developed that
salaries for some executives had become excessive. 86 The economy,
from the perspective of ordinary workers, was not doing particularly
well, yet the compensation of some executives was increasing dramati-
cally.87 The complaints grew louder when President George H.W. Bush
traveled to Japan with automobile executives from the United States. 88
Media coverage of the trip compared the American executives' salaries
with those of their Japanese counterparts, which were significantly
lower.89 The U.S. public demanded a change. Section 162 did not limit
the amount of compensation paid to executives; it only required that
compensation be reasonable. When the courts applied § 162, they did so
only to re-characterize compensation and not to regulate the actual
amounts of compensation.90 Executive salaries at many corporations
continued to rise every year by percentages in the double digits, while
the value of the same corporations' stock continued to drop.9 1 There was
a great deal of public concern about the fact that executives continued to
get raises even while the corporations that employed them fared poorly. 92
86 See Cohen, supra note 3, at 3E; Tumulty, supra note 3, at 6; see also H.R. REP. No.
103-111, at 201 (1993).
87 See David Francis, How to Roll Back the Pay of the Boss, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONI-
TOR, May 17, 1991, at 9; Steve Lohr, Recession Puts a Harsh Spotlight on Hefty Pay of Top
Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, at Al; Bill Sing, Stock Rights Proved to Be the Quick-
est Way to Higher Pay and a Place Among California's 100 Top-Earning Executives, L.A.
TIMES, May 22, 1988, at I; Bob Wiemer, The Coming Crisis Over Corporate Pay, NEWSDAY,
July 17, 1995, at A24.
88 See Alison Leigh Cowan, The High-Energy Board Room, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992,
at D1; Executive Pay Top Issue at Annual Meetings; Corporations: Federal Regulators Have
Made It Easier this Year for Shareholders to Understand and Speak up About the Financial
Rewards Management Receives, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1992, at D7; see also Art Buch-
wald, America, on Auto Pilot, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1992, at Cl.
89 See sources cited supra note 87.
90 109TM CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
91 Doyle, supra note 5, at 1; SEC Strikes Blow for Shareholder Rights Execs' Pay Must
Be Disclosed, supra note 5, at bOl; see also sources cited supra note 86.
92 See sources cited supra note 86.
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During his presidential campaign, Bill Clinton promised to rein in
the excessive compensation paid to executives. 93 As a result, in 1993,
Congress enacted § 162(m),94 The provision was intended to reduce ex-
cessive amounts of compensation by providing that a corporation would
not be permitted to deduct compensation that exceeded $1 million. 95 Ex-
ceptions to this limitation allowed corporations to pay executives more
and take a deduction for the compensation paid as long as the motive for
additional compensation was consistent with the goals of Congress, spe-
cifically to link executive compensation with the performance of the ex-
ecutive and the corporation. 96 Unfortunately, although § 162(m) appears
to have been well-intended, the provision has caused some presumably
unintended consequences.
The Senate Committee report on § 162(m) specifically states that
the $1 million limitation was not intended to "modify the present-law
requirement that in order to be deductible compensation must be reasona-
ble.' '97 Therefore, the requirements of § 162, that compensation be ordi-
nary, necessary, and reasonable are still in full effect. Congress
essentially imposed its own cap on what it viewed as reasonable compen-
sation: $1 million or less, unless the amounts received were perform-
ance-based. Congress made no exception for different types of
industries, experience of the executive, or any of the other factors laid
out by the courts. 98 Further, the provisions only apply to publicly-held
corporations. 99
Section 162(m) provides that deductible compensation is limited to
$1 million for publicly-held corporations unless the compensation is
based on performance, the corporation receives the approval of the share-
holders, and an independent compensation board determines the criteria
on which the compensation award is based.1o Performance-based com-
pensation is compensation that the executive receives once the executive
achieves a certain goal.'10 The theory behind the performance-based ex-
ception was that the amount of compensation alone does not make com-
93 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6; Susan J. Stabile, Is
There a Role for Tax Law in Policing Executive Compensation?, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 81,
87-88 (1998).
94 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13.211, 107
Stat. 416, 469 (1993) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(m) (West 2007)).
95 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(1).
96 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 647 (1993).
97 See SEN. Comm. R., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211, n. 1.
98 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(m).
99 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(2).
100 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(1), 162(m)(4)(C). A corporation is considered publicly held if it
has a class of common equity securities that are required to be registered under § 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. I.R.C. § 162(m)(2).
t1 I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C).
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pensation unreasonable, and if the amount were tied to better
performance in the corporation and the executive, then the amount of
compensation would be reasonable. 10 2 Section 162(m) applies to the
chief executive officer and any of the four highest-paid employees of the
corporation. 0 3 The term compensation is intended to include all cash
payments, benefits, and any other remuneration paid in any forms other
than cash. 1°4 If stock options do not meet the performance-based excep-
tion, they are included in the $1 million cap when they are exercised-
not when they are granted.105 This is so even if the options are related to
services that were performed in an earlier year. 10 6
An executive who receives stock options is receiving the right to
purchase the corporation's stock at a specific price during a certain time
period. An example of a stock option grant that is not subject to the $1
million cap of § 162(m) would be a grant to an executive for the right to
buy 5,000 shares of the company at $25 a share. If shares of the com-
pany currently trade at $25 a share, the executive will not actually realize
any compensation from the grant until the shares increase in value to $26
a share. 10 7 At that point, if the executive exercises his right to buy the
shares, then the executive will end up with $1 of profit per share (or
$5,000 total). Section 162(m) excludes this type of compensation from
the cap because it is implicitly performance-based; the executive only
profits from the grant of stock options if the stock price actually in-
creases. The executive will therefore try to increase the stock price in the
corporation by performing well. Because the shareholders also want to
have the stock price in the corporation increased, the shareholders' and
102 See Gray & Co. v. United States, 35 F.2d 968, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1929); Botany Worsted
Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 292 (1929); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, at 646,
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 877. Some commentators have stated that "we cannot
reliably distinguish good CEOs from bad .... Even in hindsight, it is impossible to sort out
exactly how much of a firm's success or failure was due to the individual CEO." Franklin
Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 145 (2003).
103 I.R.C. § 162(m)(3). This is based on the disclosure requirements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(3)(2); STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH
CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 27
(Comm. Print 2002) [hereinafter 107TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION].
104 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(E). Compensation also includes all compensation the execu-
tive receives from the corporation regardless of when the compensation was earned or whether
the compensation is for services as a covered employee unless the compensation is specifically
excluded from the deduction limitation. See 107TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra
note 103, at 27. Compensation that is not included in § 162(m) includes commissions, com-
pensation payable solely because of the attainment of one or more performance goals, pay-
ments to a tax-qualified retirement plan, amounts otherwise excluded from the executive's pay,
and any compensation pursuant to a contract in effect prior to February 17, 1993. See I.R.C.
§ 162(m)(4).
105 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi) (1996).
106 See SEN. COMM. R., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211.
107 See id.
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the executive's interests are aligned and the executive has an added in-
centive to perform well for the corporation.
Stock options that have an exercise price below the current price of
shares (referred to as in-the money options) are not exempt from the $1
million cap.' 08 An in-the money stock option, for example, would be if
our executive in the previous example was granted an option to purchase
stock at $20 when the market share price was $25. The executive does
not have to perform well (or perform at all) to profit from the grant. As
soon as the options are granted the executive will profit $5 per share.
Therefore, the performance-based exception does not apply. 109 The
same principle applies to re-pricing stock options. If in our example
above the executive is given the right to purchase stock options at $25
while stock prices are $25 a share, and then share price drops to $12 a
share, at which point the executive's stock options are re-priced to $12 a
share, then the executive does not have to perform well to realize any
profits. If stock price and executive performance are correlated, the ex-
ecutive has in fact performed badly and yet will still be rewarded. There-
fore, re-priced options are not exempt from the $1 million cap of
§ 162(m). 110
The two types of stock options that are typically granted as compen-
sation to executives are statutory stock options and nonqualified stock
options.111 Statutory stock options are not included in the gross income
of the executive when the executive receives the grant or when the exec-
utive exercises the option.' 1 2 The corporation itself is not allowed a de-
duction on the grant or exercise of the statutory stock options. 1 3 Once
the executive actually sells the stock he received by exercising his stock
options, the employee is taxed at capital gains rates on the excess of the
amount he receives on the sale over the exercise price of the stock op-
tions. 114 The corporation is still not entitled to a deduction. 115 If the
exercise price was set below the price of stock at the time of the grant,
then the amount between the exercise price and the fair market value of
the stock at the time of grant will be ordinary income. 116 The corpora-
tion will still not be entitled to a deduction." 17
108 See H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 21 (1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(B) (1996).
109 See SEN. COMM. R., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211.
110 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(B) (1996).
111 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 34.
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Nonqualified stock options are another type of stock option that ex-
ecutives may receive. These options are used more often than statutory
stock options, presumably because the income to the executive is deduct-
ible to the corporation as a compensation expense. 1 8 Nonqualified stock
options are only included into an executive's gross income on the grant
of the option if the option has a readily ascertainable fair market value at
the time the option is granted. 119 Generally nonqualified stock options
do not have a readily ascertainable fair market value; however, if they
do, the amount of the fair market value of the option over what was paid
for the option is included in the executive's gross income on the grant. 120
If the option does not have a readily ascertainable fair market value, then
the executive does not have any gross income on the grant. Instead,
when the executive exercises the options, he will have ordinary income
equal to the fair market value of the stock he receives, less his cost.12
1
The corporation will get a compensation deduction equal to the amount
of the executive's gross income. 122
There are four requirements of the performance-based exception in
§ 162(m): 1) compensation paid to an executive is paid solely for meet-
ing one or more performance goals; 2) a compensation committee con-
sisting of two or more outside directors approved the performance
goals; 23 3) the shareholders approve the material terms for which the
compensation will be paid, including the performance goals; and 4) prior
to the payment, the committee certified that the executive met the per-
formance goals.' 2 4 To be valid under the performance exception, the
compensation and goals must be clear enough that a third party with
knowledge of the performance results could calculate the amount of
compensation that the executive would receive.'2 5
A deduction for stock options will not be subject to the limitations
of § 162(m) as long as the shareholders have approved of the plan and an
independent board of directors has approved the criteria.' 26 The require-
ments were intended to ensure that shareholders approved of the com-
118 See id. at 34-35.




123 A director is considered an outside director if he or she is not a current employee of
the corporation (or related entities), is not a former employee of the corporation (or related
entities) who is receiving compensation for prior services (other than payments under a tax-
qualified pension plan), was not an officer of the corporation (or related entities) at any time,
and is not currently receiving compensation for personal services from the corporation other
than in his or her capacity as a director. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(3)(i) (1996).
124 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 4.
125 Id.
126 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C) (West 2007); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2) (1996).
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pensation and the compensation is tied to the performance of the
executive and the corporation. With the approval of the shareholders and
a link between compensation and performance, the corporation does not
have to forgo corporate deduction for the executive's pay.' 2 7 If compen-
sation is tied to performance, the compensation is not considered exces-
sive. 1 28 To meet the shareholder approval requirement in the exception
under § 162(m), a majority of the shares voted must approve the com-
pensation, or the compensation plan, in a separate vote. 12 9
The requirement that a compensation committee certify the achieve-
ment of performance goals is not necessary in the case of stock option
grants. Stock options and other stock appreciation rights automatically
meet the performance exception so long as they are approved both by
shareholders and an independent board of directors. 130 The certification
requirement is unnecessary for such grants because they tie the amount
of compensation to the increase in the corporation's stock price, which
the law considers an objective indicator of executive performance.1 3'
Grants of restricted stock do not qualify for the performance-based ex-
ception unless the executive is required to meet independent performance
requirements to receive them.' 32 In addition, the requirement that a third
127 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(C). In addition to the enactment of § 162(m), in 1993 the
Securities and Exchange Commission also enacted several disclosure rules for corporations to
their shareholders. Congress required that not only must the compensation be disclosed to the
shareholders in the annual proxy statements, but that it be disclosed in chart form. See 17
C.F.R. § 229.402 (1992); Executive Compensation Disclosure, Securities Act Release No.
6962, Exchange Act Release No. 31,327, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
85,056 (Oct. 16, 1992). Anecdotal evidence suggests that prior to the disclosure in charts, the
compensation of executives was undeterminable in proxy statements-even to institutions in-
vestors. See 1994 Corporate Law Symposium: Presentations and Panel Discussion, 63 U.
CN. L. REv. 769, 770-71 [hereinafter Corporate Law Symposium]. Corporations, or perhaps
their lawyers, buried the approval in shareholder proxy forms. Initially shareholders had
trouble finding and understanding the compensation plans, but Sarbanes-Oxley now requires
that they be clearer to shareholders. See Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor
Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
128 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
129 See id. at 27.
130 I.R.C. § 162(m); see also 107TiH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 103,
at 28-29. This assumes that the compensation amount the executive will receive from the
stock option grant is not contingent on her attaining a performance goal. See H.R. REP. No.
103-111, at 648-49 (1993).
131 See discussion supra pp. 400-06. This exception to the certification requirement does
not apply to stock option grants that use an exercise price below the fair market value of the
stock at the time of the grant or to stock option grants that protect the executive from decreases
in the value of the stock (such as through repricing); see also 109TH CONG., EXEcuTnvE COM-
PENSATION, supra note 20, at 40.
132 See SEN. COMM. R., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211. Restricted stock is
not included in the performance-based exception for stock appreciation rights because the ex-
ecutive may receive compensation even if the stock price declines or remains the same. There-
fore, the law considers a grant of restricted stock to be cash compensation. 107Tn CONG.,
EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 103, at 29.
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party or an objective formula determine the amount of compensation
with knowledge of the relevant performance results is not required for
stock options or stock appreciation rights. 133
a. Shareholder Involvement
Presumably Congress was attempting to garner shareholder partici-
pation through the enactment of § 162(m).' 34 While shareholder ap-
proval of performance-based compensation, including a grant of stock
options, is usually required, that is not the case for the compensation of
each executive. Rather, shareholders approve the stock option plan as a
whole for all executives covered under the plan. 135 This allows corpora-
tions some degree of flexibility to award stock options without seeking
shareholder approval every time.' 36 However, it also, prevents share-
holders from approving each executive's compensation package individ-
ually, even those executives hired after the shareholders approve the
plan. In addition, the range of possible stock option grants under the
plan may be so large that it may be difficult to determine from the plan
the amount of stock options the corporation will pay an executive. Fur-
thermore, some research suggests that increasing shareholder access to
133 See 107T CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 103, at 28.
134 The SEC made multiple attempts to increase shareholder regulation of excessive com-
pensation amounts by making those amounts more clear to shareholders. See Corporate Law
Symposium, supra note 127, at 770-71. As the Director of the Division of Corporate Finance
at the SEC noted, the compensation sections of proxy statements were "wholly unintelligible."
Id. at 770. Once, someone gave several institutional investor analysts a proxy statement to see
if they could discern the amount of compensation the executive were to receive. Each analyst
came up with a different amount and the differences between the estimated numbers were vast.
Id. at 771.
In 1992, despite the adoption of new disclosure rules in proxy statements, executive com-
pensation amounts increased. Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate
Governance, 45 ALA. L. REV. 783, 807-08 (1994). The new rules coincided with the enact-
ment of § 162(m), under which compensation amounts increased through stock options grants.
See Press Release, SEC, SEC Votes to Adopt Changes to Disclosure Requirements Concerning
Executive Compensation and Related Matters (July 26, 2006), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2006/2006-123.htm.
After the public outrage from the Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco International corporate
scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which imposed even higher disclosure
rules for executive compensation. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (2002). In addition, the Federal Accounting Standards Board revised its rules in 2005 to
require corporations to list executive stock options as an expense on their financial statements.
See FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FIN. ACCOUNTING FOUND., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 123: ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION (1995).
This may make stock options less attractive to corporations because it will lower their stated
earnings.
135 See SEN. COMM. R., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211.
136 Directors may retain discretion for the precise number of options that they grant to an
executive as long as it is less than the maximum number that shareholders have approved. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A) (1996).
TAXING EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
proxy statements has not resulted in a change in shareholder proposals
relating to executive compensation. 37
Shareholders exhibit an interesting dynamic. The two basic types of
shareholders, individual and institutional, may have very different mo-
tives and perspectives. 38 Individual shareholders rarely have any power
in influencing corporate action and appear more likely than institutional
shareholders to challenge executive compensation as a result of informa-
tion contained in proxy statements. 39 Individual shareholders may also
bring actions against corporations as derivative suits claiming a breach of
fiduciary duty by the board of directors or that compensation amounts
are a waste of corporate assets.140
Institutional investors may fear objecting to an executive compensa-
tion package because the stock market might react to a public objection
reducing the stock price, and an objection may damage the investor's
relationships with the corporation's management. 41 Therefore, they
would likely prefer to object behind closed doors rather than through a
shareholder vote. 142 Additionally, because the amount of executive com-
pensation is not enough to affect the institutional investor's overall port-
folio value, institutional investors are more likely to overlook excessive
compensation. 143 Institutional investors, however, are concerned that ex-
ecutives are able to insulate their compensation amounts while rank and
file employees and shareholders are subject to risk. 144
The shareholder approval requirement is further frustrated because
shareholders are often apathetic when it comes to reviewing proxy dis-
closures and voting. With respect to disclosure requirements recently
enacted by the SEC, one commentator noted, "If a shareholder is ration-
ally apathetic when considering an issue concerning executive compen-
137 Lori B. Marino, Comment, Executive Compensation and the Misplaced Emphasis on
Increasing Shareholder Access to the Proxy, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1205, 1227-30 (1999).
138 See CEO Compensation in the Post-Enron Era: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Science and Transportation, 108th Cong. 25 (2003) [hereinafter CEO Compensa-
tion Hearings] (statement of Sean Harrigan, President of the California Public Employees'
Retirement System) (stating that as an institutional investor, "[i]t is absolutely unconscionable
to see that CEO pay has swollen to 400 times that of the average production worker.").
139 See Marino, supra note 137, at 1230-31.
140 See 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1460 (2007); see, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co.,
907 A.2d 693, 745-49 (Del. 2005); Gagliardi v. Tirfoods International, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049,
1052 (Del. 1996); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988); see also Hillary Sale,
Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004).
141 See Marino, supra note 137, at 1234.
142 CEO Compensation Hearings, supra note 138, at 4 (statement of Peter C. Clapman,
Senior Vice President and Chief Counsel of Corporate Governance, TIAA-CREF) (stating that
TIAA-CREF, as a large financial services company and proponent for shareholder rights and
corporate governance, prefers "quiet diplomacy," though it would file shareholder resolutions
if necessary).
143 Marino, supra note 137, at 1235.
144 Id.
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sation, then the details required by the disclosure regulations will not
benefit that shareholder because the shareholder will not take the time to
become informed."' 145 Shareholder action on executive compensation is
also hindered by the free rider syndrome, where shareholders assume the
other shareholders will become informed and take appropriate action so
the free riders ignore the issues. 146 As a result, no one becomes informed
and no action is ever taken.147
Although the shareholder approval requirement has been ineffec-
tive, shareholders often have no other means of objecting to compensa-
tion amounts. Because courts have been unresponsive to court actions
brought by shareholders objecting to compensation levels, 148 it is impor-
tant to give shareholders some ability to bless or reject a compensation
package. Section 162(m) should be repealed, but Congress should con-
sider retaining shareholder approval for the deductibility of compensa-
tion packages. While shareholders may not always take advantage of
their ability to object, if the disclosure of compensation packages were
less opaque, shareholders might be more likely to participate in executive
compensation.
b. Board of Directors
The performance-based exception in § 162(m) also requires ap-
proval by an independent board of directors. The board of directors is
not an effective check on the level of executive compensation because
directors are often beholden to management. 149 Several commentators
have noted that the independent board requirement has not resulted in
lower levels of executive compensation. 150 Boards passively "rubber-
stamp" the decisions of executives. 15 1 Further, directors often act more
like employees of executive management than representatives of
shareholders. ' 52
145 Nathan Knutt, Note, Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal
Thyself, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 493, 503 (2005).
146 Id. at 504.
147 Id.
148 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
149 Kreinberg, supra note 34, at 162.
15o Charles M. Elson, Director Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-
The History of a Symptom and a Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 128 (1996); see also LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXEC-
UTIVE COMPENSATION 26-28 (2004); MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY
13-16, 178-79, 185-86 (1971) (finding that boards of directors usually serve an advisory role
rather than a decision making one and thus do not truly govern the business affairs of
corporations).
151 Id.
152 See Elson, supra note 150, at 133.
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"Rubber stamp" was the exact term the Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion used to generally describe the actions of Enron's Compensation
Committee of the Board of Directors.1 53 The compensation committee
generally rubber-stamped compensation that seemed consistent with that
of executives at other companies rather than basing their decision on the
worth of the executive to Enron.' 54 Enron's compensation committee's
evaluation of reasonable compensation, based on what similarly situated
employees make at similarly situated corporations, is entirely consistent
with the determination of reasonable compensation under § 162. Also,
negotiations between the directors and the executive were insufficient
when setting compensation levels for the executive. 55
Because the CEO, in effect, hires compensation consultants, those
consultants have an incentive to justify the amount the executive wants
for compensation so that the executive will recommend the consultant to
other CEOs. 156 Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried in their book, Pay With-
out Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation,
argue that the CEO has so much influence over the board of directors
that the board cannot be a sufficient check on the CEO. 157 They also
argue that because of this influence, CEOs can essentially set their own
compensation.158 Their position is consistent with what transpired at En-
ron. The limitations set out in § 162(m) do not appear to have any effect
on preventing this type of abuse.
2. The Effect of § 162(m) on Excessive Executive Compensation
One of two things happened to executive salaries after the enact-
ment of § 162(m): either corporations forwent the deduction; or the com-
pensation of executives, excluding stock options, was set at $1
million. 59 Many corporations decided that the limitations interfered
with their ability to set what they deemed to be the appropriate level of
compensation and, as a result, decided that it was in the best long-term
interests of the corporation to forgo the deduction. 160 This result in turn
153 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF EN-
RON CORPORATION AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION
ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: JCS-3-03, at 19, 36 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION].
154 Id. at 36.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 38.
157 See BE13CHUK & FRIED, supra note 150, at 26-28.
158 See id. at 38-40.
159 See 109Tn CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6-7.
160 See id.; see also Corporate Law Symposium, supra note 127, at 781-82 (stating that a
number of companies decided to forgo the deduction, some reportedly because the limitation
imposed by § 162(m) would interfere with their ability to act in the best short- and long-term
interests of their shareholders); Steven Balsam & Qin Jennifer Yin, Explaining Firm Willing-
ness to Forfeit Tax Deductions Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m): The Million-
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cost shareholders more than the compensation alone would have cost
prior to § 162(m). Compensation was still based on the market, and now
corporations were not entitled to a deduction. This result was contrary to
the intention of Congress, to protect shareholders and conversely resulted
in the opposite effect, a greater expense to shareholders. In the other
cases, $1 million now became the standard for executive salaries. 161
Corporations, in an attempt to comply with § 162(m), set salary at or
below $1 million and instead offered other types of compensation not
limited by § 162(m), such as stock options. 162
Stock options are not optimal for tying an executive's performance
to compensation because they do not truly align the interests of share-
holders and executives. Executives are more interested in a short-term
increase in the stock price, allowing them to sell their exercised stock
options at a profit as early as possible. Shareholders, in contrast, are
generally interested in the corporation's long-term growth. 163 This was
particularly evident in the Enron case. 164 As one commentator noted,
"Given the harm that stock options can do to investor interests, manage-
ment's use of stock options and stock compensation are a sign that man-
agers are being disloyal to investors, especially when management
chooses not to record the cost of the options in its income statements
given to investors."'165
Enron in fact had a pay-for-performance compensation philoso-
phy. 166 Enron's compensation for its 200 highest paid employees in
2000 was $1.4 billion-$1.2 billion of which was attributable to stock
options and restricted stock.167 Enron's main form of compensation was
stock-based compensation such as stock options, restricted stock and
phantom stock. 168
Dollar Cap, 24 J. AccT. & PUn. POL'Y 300, 321 (2005) (finding that almost forty percent of
affected corporations forfeited deductions rather than comply with the $1 million cap).
161 See Scott DeCarlo, What the Boss Makes, FORBES.COM, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.
forbes.com/2006/04/20/ceo-pay-options-cz sw_0420ceopay.html (stating that in 2005 Richard
D. Fairbank, CEO of Capital One Financial, had no base salary, but had a total compensation
amount of $249.3 million, Terry S. Semel, CEO of Yahoo!, made $600,000 in base salary with
a total compensation amount of $231 million, and Richard S. Fuld Jr., CEO of Lehman Broth-
ers Holdings, made $750,000 in base salary with a total compensation amount of $123
million).
162 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 7; see also Balsam &
Yin, supra note 160, at 320-21.
163 See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION, supra note 153, at 41.
164 Id.
165 Calvin H. Johnson, The Disloyalty of Stock and Stock Option Compensation, II CONN.
INS. L.J. 133, 134 (2005).
166 See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION, supra note 153, at 13.
167 See id. at 36.
168 See id. at 14.
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In 2003, the Joint Committee on Taxation prepared a 700-page re-
port on Enron's compensation practices. 169 In this report, the Committee
noted that the $1 million limitation imposed by § 162(m) had little effect
on the company.170 The Committee went on to state that the limitation
of § 162(m) had been included to address the excessive compensation
amounts that some executives were receiving.' 7 1 Furthermore, the Com-
mittee recommended removing § 162(m) altogether. 172 As the Commit-
tee noted, "[T]he experience with Enron indicates that the limitation is
not effective in achieving its purposes. Taxpayers may choose to pay
nondeductible compensation, and accept the potential adverse tax
consequences." 173
Because stock options are considered performance-based and there-
fore excluded from the deduction limitations of § 162(m), many corpora-
tions began granting stock options as the major component of executive
compensation. 174 Stock options had been granted prior to the enactment
of § 162(m), but were generally a small part of a compensation pack-
age.175 However, this changed following the enactment of § 162(m) in
1993. After the enactment of § 162(m) there was an increase in stock
option grants, followed by unanticipated massive growth in the stock
market.' 76 The stock market experienced record growth in the late
1990s. As a result of this combination of massive increase of stock op-
tions and the significant growth of the stock market, executives began
making record amounts of compensation. Some commentators have ar-
gued that the growth of stock options was behind the stock market bub-
ble and its collapse. 177 Less aggressive arguments have been that the
increase in executive compensation was "the first result of the increase in
incentive compensation in the form of stock options."' 78 These stock
options were implemented by corporate boards in response to demands
that executive compensation be more closely linked to shareholder
returns. 179
169 Id.
170 See id. at 42.
171 See Report of Investigation of Enron Corporation and Related Entities Regarding
Federal Tax and Compensation Issues, and Policy Recommendations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Finance, 108TH CONG., 36 (2003) (written testimony of Lindy Paull, Chief of Staff,
Joint Comm. on Taxation).
172 See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION, supra note 153, at 20.
173 See id. at 43.
174 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
175 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 49, at 101.
176 See id.
177 See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas-The Securities
and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79,
104 (2005).
178 Loewenstein, The Conundrum, supra note 12, at 8.
179 See id.
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In response to the limitations of § 162, executives demanded pay
comparable to that which similarly situated executives were receiving.
Executives argued that stock options were riskier than fixed cash salaries
and bonuses because there is no guarantee that the stock price will rise.
Consequently, they demanded stock options equaling a larger value than
they would have received had they simply been paid outright in salary. 180
As a result of the growth of stock options and the concurrent growth of
the stock market, the comparable amounts grew dramatically. 181 How-
ever, because of the nature of the stock market in the late 1990s, it is
unclear whether the argument that stock options were risky actually had
merit. 182
After the passage of § 162(m), compensation paid to executives
grew at a "29 percent faster rate in the first year after the law took effect
than in the previous 14 years that the service had collected comparable
information."' 8 3 On average, stock options made up 3 to 5% of a corpo-
ration's stock in 1994.184 In 2002 this percentage tripled to 12 to
15%.185 Additionally, 79% of the increase in median compensation paid
to chief executive officers from 1992 to 2000 was primarily due to the
increased use of stock options.' 86 In 1992, stock options were "27 per-
cent of median CEO compensation, Whereas by 2000 options were 60
percent of median compensation."'187 Executives who were now paid in
"performance-based" stock options rather than cash demanded a higher
amount of stock options than the value of the cash they would have re-
ceived, in order to compensate them for the possible risk of stock de-
cline. 188 The cash the executives would have received was guaranteed,
180 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6; see also CONFER-
ENCE BD. COMM'N ON PUB. TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTER., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
PART 1: EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 4 (2002) [hereinafter CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N] (stating
that factors including the speculative nature of stock options, which are undervalued by execu-
tives and therefore necessitate higher levels of stock option grants, led to a "perfect storm" to
create an environment "ripe for abuse").
181 See AFL-CIO, 2007 Executive Paywatch, http://www.aflcio.org/corporatewatch/pay
watch/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2008) (stating that the average CEO in an S&P 500 company
made $14.78 million in 2006); see also Murphy, supra note 30, at 847 (stating that median pay
of a CEO in 1992 was $2.3 million); News in Brief, supra note 10, at 1; Soto & Meacham,
supra note 7; You Bought, They Sold, supra note 7, at 64; Sahadi, supra note 10, at I.
182 See Corporate Law Symposium, supra note 127, at 805 (stating that, when offered $1
cash for each option, executives never agreed to the exchange, despite hearing the argument
that their options were essentially worthless).
183 See Stabile, supra note 93, at 89 (citing David Cay Johnston, Executive Pay Increases
at a Much Faster Rate than Corporate Revenues and Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1997, at
D4).
184 See Oversight Hearing, supra note 49, at 3.
185 See id.
186 CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N, supra note 180, at 4.
187 See id.
188 See Corporate Law Symposium, supra note 127, at 739.
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but stock options can run the risk of being worth little or nothing by the
time they can be exercised. Due to the growth of the use of stock op-
tions, executives began receiving huge amounts of compensation. This
high compensation rate became industry norm, leading to a higher com-
pensation demand by executives. Therefore, while § 162(m) was sup-
posed to rein in the excessive compensation, it only served to further
exacerbate the problem. The state of executive compensation was better
prior to enactment of § 162(m). Section 162(m) did not result in a true
link between compensation and company performance because the com-
pany performance was evaluated through stock price, and stock price is
not always linked to the performance of the executive or the corpora-
tion.' 8 9 This is particularly true when executives are motivated to ma-
nipulate stock prices to increase their compensation. In addition,
§ 162(m) ultimately resulted in more compensation being paid. Execu-
tives now receive unprecedented amounts in compensation at the ex-
pense of shareholders.
Moreover, because in the unprecedented bull market stock prices
were going up without any real connection to the performance of the
company, the dramatic increase in compensation had very little connec-
tion to the performance of the company. 190 One commentator hinted that
he suspected the conversion of cash compensation to stock options as a
result of § 162(m) was intentional. He stated that, "the explosion of op-
tion grants is evidence that the measure backfired (or was never intended
to work). A more charitable reading is that § 162(m) was supposed to
promote options (as well as other "performance compensation" such as
bonuses based on accounting earnings). 191
In fact, because § 162(m) does not require an evaluation of the per-
formance of the company as compared to, or rather indexed to, the major
stock indexes or industry indexes, it is entirely possible (and often the
case) that an executive will be compensated and rewarded simply be-
cause of the growth of the economy. However, these increases in com-
pensation are not due to inflation, but rather to the growth of the stock
market as a whole. Because a company's stock (and, by implication,
options in that stock) can become more valuable as a result of growth in
the stock market, the executive can profit even if he is doing a poor job.
189 CONFERENCE BD. COMM'N, supra note 180, at 4.
190 See id. (stating that the growth of the stock market led to "massive, unanticipated
gains from options unrelated to management's operating performance"); see also BEBCHUK &
FRIED, supra note 150, at 190 (suggesting taking into account market fluctuations when com-
pensating an executive with options, as a way to better gauge performance of the executive);
Corporate Law Symposium, supra note 127, at 739.
191 David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging, The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incen-
tive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 468 (2000).
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In the alternative, an executive's options can become less valuable when
the stock market declines, even though the executive is performing well.
3. Conclusions on the Effectiveness of § 162(m)
Section 162(m) was not effective in curtailing excessive executive
salaries. On the contrary, § 162(m) resulted in higher salaries because it
allowed corporations to avoid the problem merely by shifting the form of
compensation from cash to stock options. 192 Because stock options are
riskier than cash, and comparatively easy to hide, compensation amounts
increased dramatically and shareholders bore the increased costs in the
form of lost deductions. Moreover, § 162(m) did not result in linking
executive compensation to the performance of either the executive or the
corporation. A corporation's stock prices fluctuate independent of the
performance of its executive or of the corporation itself.193 In addition,
the executive may also be reaping the benefit of a predecessor's efforts.
Another difficulty with paying an executive in stock options is that
it may not always bring out the best in the executive or produce the best
results for the corporation. As we saw with Enron, stock options can
actually result in executives exploiting the corporation and misstating (or
inflating) earnings in order to increase the value of the options. 194 The
Joint Committee on Taxation noted that, because executive pay is ad-
versely affected during times of poor corporate performance, executives
may be inclined to manipulate earnings to provide a smoother earnings
pattern. 195
Tying executive compensation to the stock price of the corporation
through stock options incentivizes executives to see the stock price of the
corporation rise even if it is not in the best interests of the corporation.
Executives may hope to convert their options to cash as quickly as possi-
ble to maximize any possible compensation while reducing the risk they
192 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 2, 7.
193 See Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament Alterna-
tive, 54 EMORY L.J. 1557, 1567-68 (raising the issue that "broad macroeconomic factors,"
such as fluctuations in interest rates and other industry related shocks may affect stock prices
independently of the actions of an executive).
194 See Karmel, supra note 177, at 99-100 (stating that Congress itself was "so corrupted
by campaign contributions that it could not have blown the whistle on Enron."). Professor
Karmel further argues that while executive stock options were one cause of the stock market
bubble, Congress further exacerbated the problem by stopping the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board (FASB) from treating stock options as corporate expenses. See id.
In 2005 the FASB amended FASB Statements No. 123 and 95, requiring corporations to report
the grant of stock options as an expense on their financial statements. See Oversight Hearing,
supra note 49 (written testimony of Donald P. Delves, President, The Delves Group) (stating
that,"[w]ith no expense, these 'free' options were liberally given out to executives and em-
ployees (although mostly to executives) with very little rigorous thought about the effect on
shareholder value and shareholder wealth.").
195 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 8.
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face from any market declines. This encourages executives to seek
short-term stock price increases and encourages some executives to en-
gage in fraudulent or inappropriate behavior. Shareholders, on the other
hand, would often prefer to see long-term growth in the corporation
rather than short-term price increases. Congress presumably did not an-
ticipate this divergence of interests in 1993 but that divergence has pre-
vented § 162(m) from effectively curtailing compensation and has
contributed to recent abhorrent corporate behavior.
Section 162(m) also caused many corporations to forgo the deduc-
tion for compensation. 196 It was presumably the intention of Congress to
change corporate behavior by limiting deductions for compensation. 197
Instead, many corporations opted to forgo the deduction at a greater ex-
pense to the very shareholders Congress was trying to protect. While
corporations may have considered the impact of losing the deduction for
compensation paid as a result of § 162(m), other concerns-such as pres-
sure from shareholder groups, the transaction costs that would be in-
curred in changing an employment contract, the amount of compensation
being paid to similarly-situated executives at similar corporations, insider
ownership, and the tax cost of losing the deduction-affect whether a
corporation decides to forgo the deduction or limit the executive's com-
pensation. 198 The Committee on Joint Taxation has stated that § 162(m)
has not resulted in a slowing of the growth of executive compensation. 199
Furthermore, § 162(m) has resulted in corporations planning their execu-
tive compensation packages strategically to avoid the impact of the de-
duction limitation. The growth of stock options is one example of this.
It is unclear that this problem with § 162(m) has a solution-any amend-
ment would likely be subject to similar kinds of avoidance strategies.
Deferred compensation plans that avoid the application of § 162(m)
are another avoidance tactic corporations have developed.2° Instead of
heeding the advice of the Joint Committee on Taxation and removing
§ 162(m) altogether, Congress attempted to extend the reach of § 162(m)
to deferred compensation, applying the $1 million limitation to former as
well as current executives.201 The decision to propose an amendment to
196 See id.; see also Balsam & Yin, supra note 160, at 321 (finding that forty percent of
affected corporations forfeit deductions as a result of the cap imposed by § 162(m)).
197 See Meegan Reilly, Former Treasury Official Discusses Executive Compensation
Cap, 62 TAX NOTES 747 (1994) (discussing statement of Catherine Creech, former Treasury
benefits tax counsel, that § 162(m) was not intended as a revenue-raising provision but rather
as a "behavior shaping provision.").
198 See 109TH CONG., EXECUrIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
199 See id.
200 See id. at 9, 29.
201 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 1 10TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF THE CHAIR-
MAN'S MODIFICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE "SMALL BUSINESS AND WORK OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 2007," at 25 (Comm. Print 2007).
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§ 162(m) to extend its reach to deferred compensation may have been
based on the Joint Committee on Taxation's recommendation that Con-
gress should consider modifying the definition of a covered employee to
include prior employees as well. 20 2 Again, if this proposal is enacted it
will likely have one of two consequences-either companies will pay the
market rate for talented executives and will not be permitted a deduction
for the compensation expense, or they will invent another way to circum-
vent § 162(m). It is easy to imagine how partnerships or other entities
could be used to circumvent § 162(m). Most corporations are currently
so unconcerned with § 162(m) that it remains unclear whether corpora-
tions will seek alternatives rather than simply forgoing the deductions.
Because § 162(m) interferes with a corporation's ability to recruit tal-
ented executives by limiting the base compensation, many corporations
have decided that it is in their best interests simply to disregard the provi-
sion altogether and to hire the best person for the job.
Another problem with § 162(m) is that Congress has declared what
it deems a fair salary for an executive: $1 million. Courts have held that
it is not the amount of compensation that renders it excessive but rather
the terms and factors surrounding the compensation. 20 3 Congress was
short-sighted when it set the cap at $1 million in 1993 without allowing
for adjustments for inflation. Simple principles of time-value-of-money
and inflation make clear that $1 million today is not as valuable as it was
nearly fifteen years ago. Although courts say that the amount of com-
pensation cannot by itself render the compensation unreasonable, Con-
gress has deemed non-performance-based compensation of more than $1
million unreasonable. 2°4
Moreover, § 162(m) does not distinguish between corporations of
different sizes or between different levels of executive work. This is true
despite the fact that the complexity and scale of a corporation's business,
and thus the requirements of the executive's job, vary widely.
Presumably, § 162(m) was enacted to protect shareholder returns.
Congress did not, however, endeavor to offer the same protections with
regard to compensation paid to other forms of ownership, such as part-
ners in partnerships. Executives at private equity funds have received
extremely large payments, well in excess of the $1 million cap that
would not have been allowed if they had been subject to § 162(m), yet
these compensation amounts are only subject to the reasonable compen-
202 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 6.
203 See Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 292 (1929); Gray & Co. v.
United States, 35 F.2d 968, 975 (Ct. Cl. 1929).
204 See Gray & Co., 35 F.2d at 973.
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sation limits of § 162.205 In addition, the amounts paid to movie stars,
recording artists, sports figures, and other highly-paid professionals are
not subject to § 162(m). Many of these compensation packages are paid
by corporations but are not subject to the limitations of § 162(m). Sec-
tion 162(m) by its terms only applies to the CEO and the four highest
paid officers of the corporation. Therefore, compensation amounts paid
to others in the corporation are not subject to scrutiny under § 162(m),
even though they may be in excess of $1 million. If Congress was truly
concerned about shareholder returns and preventing excessive compensa-
tion, it should not limit § 162(m) to certain executives who work at cor-
porations but rather should apply it to all compensation at all
businesses. 20 6
Section 162(m) changed the form in which compensation is paid
and made it more difficult for shareholders to determine how much exec-
utive salaries actually were. In addition, some commentators have noted
that a corporation's profits are actually lowered as a result of switching
from cash compensation to performance-based compensation such as
stock options.207
Section 162(m) also resulted in an incentive for executives to en-
gage in risky or illegal behavior to maximize short-term returns. Be-
cause executive compensation was tied to stock prices, executives had a
motive to try to increase stock price to allow the executives to cash out
their stock options at a profit. Because the executives did not represent
205 See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Peter Edmonston, A Titan of Private Equity May Go
Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1 (discussing the possibility of Blackstone Group, a
private equity firm, going public and stating that "[a]s a public company, Blackstone would be
subject to the same kind of scrutiny that it has tried to avoid. The compensation and perks of
its executives, some of whom are routinely paid more than $50 million a year, would also have
to be disclosed. Mr. Schwarzman, who owns as much as 40 percent of the firm, is said to
regularly pay himself in excess of $300 illion annually, according to people close to the
firm.").
Payments to executives are often not taxed as compensation and instead taxed at capital
gains rates as partnership distributions. See Phil Mattingly & Richard Rubin, HR 3996-Tax
Increase Prevention Act of 2007, CQ BILLANALYsIs, Dec. 22, 2007.
206 There is a growing consensus that allowing partnerships, particularly private equity
funds, to distribute to their executives what is presumably compensation taxed at capital gains'
rates rather than income rates is inequitable. See Susan Beck, Securities and Corporate Gov-
ernance: A Practice Focus No Eyes on Them Clever Lawyering Lets Newly Public Firm Es-
cape Taxes and SEC Scrutiny, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at 28; Mattingly & Rubin, supra
note 205. Although fixing this disparity would result in executives paying ordinary income
tax, it would still not put a cap on the distributions the partnerships can make subject to a
deduction. See Susan Beck, Securities and Corporate Governance: A Practice Focus No Eyes
on Them Clever Lawyering Lets Newly Public Firm Escape Taxes and SEC Scrutiny, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at 28; Mattingly & Rubin, supra note 205.
207 See 109TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 20, at 8; see also Marcel
Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1869, 1888 (2001) (discussing the rising use of stock options in executive comrpensation
packages).
2008]
414 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:383
true ownership interests in the corporation and instead were employees,
they could have been motivated to act in the interests of short-term bene-
fits to realize their compensation rather than what would be in the best
interests of the corporation in the long term. This resulted in many exec-
utives taking unnecessary risks and engaging in unethical and sometimes
illegal activities to maximize short-term profits to ensure a sizeable com-
pensation amount.
C. SECTION 280G 20 8
1. Golden Parachute Payments and the Corporate Motivation
for Making These Payments
Golden parachute payments are typically given as part of an em-
ployment contract when an executive is hired.209 The thought behind the
contract provision is that an executive would not take the job without
some guarantee that, even in the event of a merger or sale, the executive
will be "taken care of" financially. Corporations thus began giving exec-
utives golden parachute agreements because the added security of pay-
ments in the event of a change in ownership of the corporation helped to
recruit executives. 210 These payments also improved executive retention
rates, increasing the "stability and continuity of management." 21 1 Fur-
ther, golden parachute payments also help ensure that management of
corporations remains objective when evaluating a change in control be-
cause the executives do not have to worry about the financial ramifica-
tions of losing their jobs once new owners take control. 212 Of course,
objectivity may not be the result in many cases where an executive
stands to reap a significant financial benefit as a result of the change in
control. Finally, parachute payments may discourage hostile takeovers
by making the proposed purchase or merger too expensive to complete
after considering the golden parachute payments. 21 3
Section 280G was enacted in response to the huge golden parachute
payments executives were receiving in the flurry of mergers in the
1980s. 214 The complaints were that golden parachute payments de-
208 Readers not familiar with the Internal Revenue Code should note the distinction
between § 280G (discussed here) and § 280(g) (repealed in 1986).
209 Ryan Miske, Note, Can't Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying
to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. Rv. 1673, 1680-81
(2004).
210 See Henry Johnson, Those "Golden Parachute" Agreements: The Taxman Cuts the
Ripcord, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 45, 48 (1985).
211 See id.
212 See id. at 49.
213 See id.
214 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE Dmcrr REDUCTION AcT OF 1984, at 199 (Comm. Print 1984).
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creased stock value, discouraged buyers from purchasing the company
because they knew they would have to make huge payments to execu-
tives, and perhaps encouraged management to cause takeovers to trigger
the huge payments that would result after a change of control. 215 All of
these scenarios disadvantaged shareholders, and Congress reacted by en-
acting I.R.C. §§ 280G and 4999. Section 280G ensures that a corpora-
tion cannot deduct a golden parachute payment, and § 4999 ensures that
an executive pays an additional 20% excise tax on the excess parachute
payment. 216 Both of these provisions were intended to limit the amount
of golden parachute payments offered and to allow for some income and
wealth distribution for the large amount the executive was receiving.217
Section 280G was intended to prevent or slow golden parachute
payments.2 18 Congress was concerned that corporations were including
golden parachute payments in employment contracts with executives as
part of a strategic plan to make hostile takeovers unattractive to inter-
ested buyers.2 19 Congress thought that because these provisions "hin-
dered acquisition activity in the marketplace," they should be
discouraged. 220 Section 280G was enacted to discourage these contract
provisions which might reduce the amounts paid to the corporation's
shareholders in the event of a change in control.221
The tax code allows some portion of a golden parachute payment to
be deductible, but any parachute payment amount over the executive's
average salary is considered excessive and will not be deductible. 22 2 The
executive will also pay a twenty percent excise tax on the parachute pay-
ment. 22 3 A golden parachute payment to an executive is considered ex-
cessive if the payment to the executive is more than three times his
average salary. 224 An executive's average salary is the average of the
last five years' compensation. 225 Payments under a qualified retirement
215 See id.
216 I.R.C. §§ 280G(a), 4999(a) (West 2007).
217 See I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999.
218 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 199 (Comm. Print 1984).
219 See id.
220 See id.
221 See id. at 199-200.
222 See I.R.C. §§ 280G(a), 280G(b)(1) (providing that the excess parachute payment will
not be allowed as a deduction and defining excess parachute payment as the amount in excess
of the (still deductible) base amount).
223 See I.R.C. §§ 280G(a)(5), 4999(a). Section 280G does not apply to corporations that
qualify as small business corporations.
224 See I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(2)(A)(iii), 280G(b)(3). The term "average salary" in this arti-
cle refers to the base amount as defined in § 280G(b)(3).
225 See I.R.C. §§ 280G(b)(3)(A), 280G(d)(2). Section 162(m) was designed to work in
conjunction with § 280G by providing that the deduction limitation of § 162(m) will be re-
duced by excess parachute payments under § 280G that are not deductible by the corporation.
See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(F).
2008]
416 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17:383
plan and payments for services rendered on or after the date of the
change in control are not considered golden parachute payments. 2 26 The
provisions apply to any employee or other person (as specified in the
regulations) who performs services for the corporation and is an officer,
shareholder, or other highly-compensated individual. 227 A highly-com-
pensated individual is any person who is among the highest one percent
of the individuals performing services for the corporation or the 250
highest paid individuals of the corporation (including corporations in the
affiliated group). 228
Section 280G only applies when a change in control has occurred.
If a corporation wants to pay an executive an enormous severance pack-
age independent of a change in control, the limitations of § 280G do not
apply. Shareholders have recently objected to the $210 million payment
received by Robert Nardelli after he resigned from Home Depot in 2007
($20 million of which was a severance payment) and the $21 million
severance payment received by Carly Fiorina from Hewlett Packard. 229
These payments, while very large, will not be subject to the deduction
limitations of § 280G or the twenty percent excise tax under § 4999, al-
though the deductible amount will be limited to the extent the payment
runs afoul of §§ 162 and 162(m). 230 Therefore, if a large severance
package is paid out in stock options, for example, it likely will be deduct-
ible regardless of amount, because stock options are performance-based
and the payment was not made in connection to a change in control.
The deduction limitations imposed by § 280G and the excise tax
under § 4999 only apply if a change in control occurs and only if the
payment to the executive was contingent on a change in control. 23 1 A
change in control takes place when effective control of the corporation
has changed hands, the ownership of the corporation has changed or a
substantial portion the underlying assets of the corporation has changed
ownership. 232 The penalties under §§ 280G and 4999 can be avoided if
226 See 107TH CONG., EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION, supra note 103, at 30.
227 See I.R.C. § 280G(c).
228 See id.
229 See Ylan Q. Mui, Home Depot's CEO Resigns, and His Hefty Payout Raises Ire,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2007, at D1.
230 Section 280G would not apply because the payment does not result from a change in
control. See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A). The $1,000,000 limitation under § 162(m) would apply
to the payment because it exceeds the amount limitation and presumably is not tied to the
executive's attainment of a certain performance goal, namely being terminated. See I.R.C.
§ 162(m); see also Rev. Rul. 2008-13 (further clarifying that compensation will not be consid-
ered "performance-based" under § 162(m), even if the compensation is paid upon the attain-
ment of the performance goal, if the plan agreement or contract provides for payment of
compensation to an executive upon the attainment of a performance goal or for (1) termination
without "cause" or for "good reason" or (2) voluntary retirement).
231 See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(2)(A)(i).
232 See id.
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the taxpayer can prove by clear and convincing evidence that the com-
pensation is reasonable compensation for personal services actually ren-
dered before the change in control.233
The enactment of §§ 280G and 4999 resulted in executives often
requiring that the company pay the excise tax to the IRS on behalf of the
executive if they are to be paid a golden parachute payment.234 Because
of the twenty percent excise tax for the executive and the twenty percent
tax that arises on the tax payment, and so on, the parachute payment
ultimately costs the company and the shareholders $1,499,988 rather
than just $1 million. 235
One author has posited that the limitations on golden parachute pay-
ments has functioned essentially as a congressional blessing for corpora-
tions to pay 299% of the base amount and as a result, this is the standard
in corporations in many employment contracts. 236
2. The Intent Behind § 280G
The enactment of § 280G was partly motivated by a concern that
golden parachute payments discouraged interested companies from pro-
ceeding with acquisitions or potential buyers from becoming interested
in the first place. 237 The substantial payments to top executives would
increase the acquisition cost significantly and, as a result, a potential pur-
chaser might reconsider the purchase. 238 The Joint Committee on Taxa-
tion stated that the limitation imposed by § 280G might be "viewed as
233 See I.R.C. § 280G(b)(4).
234 See CEO Compensation Hearings, supra note 138, at 28 (prepared statement of Sean
Harrigan, President, Board of Administration, California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem) (noting that there "appears to be an attitude of entitlement[s]," including gross-up provi-
sions covering executives' tax liabilities, "in the executive suite of corporate America.");
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE DEFIcrr REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 200 (Joint Comm. Print 1984).
235 $1,499,988 is based on the following calculation. $1,000,000 x 20% = $200,000.
Gross up provisions may also include an agreement for the corporation to pay for the addi-
tional income taxes on the grossed up amount meaning that the corporation will pay 20% tax
on the subsequent taxes plus 40% (assuming a hypothetical combined state and federal tax rate
of 40%). $200,000 x 60% = $120,000. $120,000 x 60% = $72,000. $72,000 x 60% =
$43,200. $43,200 x 60% = $25,920. $25,920 x 60% = $15,552. $15,552 x 60% = $9,331.
$9,331 x 60% = $5,599. $5,599 x 60% = $3,359. $3,359 x 60% = $2016. $2,016 x 60% =
$1,209. $1,209 x 60% = $726. $726 x 60% = $435. $435 x 60% = $261. $261 x 60% =
$157. $157 x 60% = $94. $94 x 60% = $56. $56 x 60% = $34. $34 x 60% = $20. $20 x
60% = $12. $12 x 60% = $7. $200,000 + $120,000 + $72,000 + $43,200 +$ 25,920 + $15,552
+ 9,331 + $5,599 + $3,359 + $2,016 + $1,209 + $726 + $435 + $261 + $157 + $94 + $56 +
$34 + $20 + $12 + $7 = $499,988. Therefore the corporation would be paying the executive
$1,000,000 plus an additional $499,988 in tax liabilities. In addition, this amount does not
include the cost to shareholders of the loss of the deduction on this payment to the executive.
236 See Miske, supra note 209, at 1680 (2004).
237 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 199 (Comm. Print 1984).
238 See id.
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indirectly favoring friendly acquisitions." 239 Presumably this is because
if a purchaser is friendly, exceptions to a golden parachute payment
clause could be made once the executive was given reassurance of a job
after the sale.
Again, as with § 162(m), the effects of § 280G directly contradict
the legislative intent of the statute, which was to protect the shareholders
from excessive amounts being paid to the executives. 240 Not only will
the excess payments and the gross-up 24' not be deductible to the corpora-
tion as a result of §§ 280G and 4999, but it will now cost the sharehold-
ers even more because of the additional amounts paid to executives to
cover additional taxes.242
Executives often demand these payments before signing onto a new
corporation, not only to give them security in case of a clash in corporate
culture or some other unexpected situation, but also to compensate them
for payments they would have received had they not been recruited away
from their former employers. 243 While one cannot fault an executive for
negotiating the best compensation package possible, sometimes life
presents difficult choices and the risk of switching jobs is one of them.
Many taxpayers wish they had a guarantee that a major life change
would be risk free. However, that is not an accurate representation of
reality-unless of course you are an executive with a golden parachute.
Therefore, it is up to the board of directors in a true arm's length transac-
tion to obtain executives' services at the lowest cost to the corporation.
Nevertheless, if the market requires a golden parachute in order to recruit
a talented executive, corporations will likely provide them regardless of
the tax consequences.
239 STAFF OF THE J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS
OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND OTHER CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 4 n.5 (Comm.
Print 1985). This is an exception to the Joint Committee's statement that "the Code neither
encourages nor discourages a hostile, as opposed to a friendly, acquisition." See id. at 4.
240 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVE-
NUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 200 (Joint Comm. Print 1984).
241 A "gross-up" occurs when a corporation agrees to pay taxes for an executive, which in
turn gives rise to a tax payment due on the taxes the employer paid. The "gross-up" amount is
the total amount that the corporation must pay to completely pay an employee's tax liability.
For example, if a corporation agrees to pay 20% on $1,000,000, the tax payment would be
$200,000. Now the employee has a tax liability of $200,000 and the tax payment on that
would be $40,000, which would also constitute income to the employee. See, e.g., Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 87 F.2d 131 (1936).
242 See CEO Compensation Hearings, supra note 138, at 28 (prepared statement of Sean
Harrigan, President, Board of Administration, California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem) (noting that there "appears to be an attitude of entitlement[s]," including gross-up provi-
sions covering executives' tax liabilities, "in the executive suite of corporate America.");
STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 200 (Joint Comm. Print 1984).
243 See Julie Cresswell, Pay Packages Allow Executives to Jump Ship with Less Risk,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2006, at Al.
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In summary, because parachute payments are often still part of ex-
ecutive compensation contracts, whatever the reasons, corporations are
now losing deductions for any excess compensation paid plus the extra
twenty percent excise taxes often paid on behalf the executives. As such,
the anti-golden parachute provisions do not make the corporate compen-
sation structure better for shareholders; rather, they make the whole pros-
pect more expensive for the shareholders. While the executives remain
in the same favorable position, the corporations have to forfeit the deduc-
tions, resulting in less profit for the shareholders. In addition, the share-
holders still face the possibility that the corporation is too expensive to
purchase. These results are inconsistent with the intent behind the provi-
sions, mainly to help protect shareholder interests.
III. RESULTS OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND SOLUTIONS
A. RESULTS OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION
In spite of, or maybe because of the provisions Congress has en-
acted to regulate executive compensation, executive compensation con-
tinues to grow.244 In fact, as a result of the growth in the use of stock
options and a concurrent boom in the stock market in the late 1990s, very
high amounts of executive compensation have become the norm.245
Even though § 162, the basic code provision that regulates whether exec-
utive compensation is deductible, requires that a compensation amount
be ordinary and necessary, it is difficult to see how executive compensa-
tion will fail this requirement in many instances. The compensation of
executives is an ordinary expense, and as a result of the growth of the
stock market, the amount that is considered reasonable has increased
dramatically.
This is really an ability-to-pay theory of tax equity. Presumably, the
benefit of the deduction for compensation expenses to the corporation
inures to the shareholders. Denying that benefit therefore hurts the
shareholders but does not hurt executives because the executives' pay is
not affected whether the corporation is able to deduct the compensation
or not. Similarly, under § 162(m), a corporation can get the deduction if
it issues performance-based stock options. It appears that the benefit of
deduction comes at the expense of diluting shareholders' ownership in-
terests. Therefore, §§ 280G and 162(m) look as if they are regressive in
nature. It would seem more appropriate if the tax laws designed to limit
compensation targeted the ultimate expense to executives, rather than
244 Sahadi, supra note 10; see also sources cited supra note 7.
245 Sahadi, supra note 10; see also sources cited supra note 7.
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shareholders. 246 The same can be said of stock options. The corporation
can get the deduction if the corporation complies with § 162(m) by issu-
ing performance-based stock options, but only if it dilutes shareholder
ownership interests by issuing the options. Therefore, §§ 280G and
162(m) are regressive in nature. The tax law should target executives,
not shareholders. 247
Congressional legislation tying compensation to stock options was a
mistake. The reality is that shareholders and corporate executives have
different interests. 248 Shareholders own the corporation and want to see
the corporation grow profitable, distribute proceeds, and minimize costs.
Executive compensation is an expense of the corporation, and executives
expect to be paid well. Trying to merge these interests by giving execu-
tives stock ownership in the hope that they would adopt the goals or
motives of shareholders does not appear to work. It may also be unnec-
essary. For example, there are job preservation incentives-the idea that
executives will perform well because they want to keep their jobs. 24 9
Therefore, with better corporate governance, executives might have to
246 This might be achieved through a more progressive tax system. See Brian R. Chef-
fins, The Metamorphosis of "Germany Inc. ": The Case of Executive Pay, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
497, 511-12 (2001) ("If a country's tax regime is strongly 'progressive' in the sense that the
marginal rate (the rate applicable to any further taxable income) increases substantially at
higher levels of pay, this will tend to dampen increases in executive pay. Under such circum-
stances, top managers will not value additional income as much as they would in a more
liberal tax regime because they will keep less of what they earn.").
Over the last twenty years, the United States has had the lowest historical tax rates since
1917, excluding the period from 1925 to 1931 where tax rates were between 24 and 25%. See
Top Marginal Income Tax Rates 1913-2003, http://www.truthandpolitics.org/top-rates.php
(last visited Feb. 18, 2008). Tax rates in the 1930s ranged from 63% to 79%. See id. From
1940s to 1960s, tax rates ranged from 70% to 91%. See id. In the 1970s and early 80s, tax
rates on earned income was 50-60%. See id. It was in 1987 that tax rates dropped to 38.5%
and then to 28% in the following year. See id. Much higher tax rates are thus not unheard of
and might result in a more fair result because they would require those earning more to take on
a larger share of the tax burden.
Higher marginal rates could result in distortions of behaviors, just as §§ 162(m) and 280G
distorted corporate behaviors. However, legislative solutions to these problems may be availa-
ble. For example, recently there have been calls to repeal many provisions that are used to
shelter income to avoid falling into higher tax brackets. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., The
Mathew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 993, 1002-05, 1128 (2004). Moreover,
the costs of any behavior distortions tolerated by Congress will accrue to the government, not
to shareholders. Finally, higher marginal rates would not only affect executives, but would
extend to other groups of tax payers as well. See id. This seems entirely consistent with the
ideals Congress espoused when it enacted § 162(m). The corporate form is not the only type
of business entity paying extreme amounts of compensation. See Beck, supra note 206, at 28;
Mattingly & Rubin, supra note 205. The tax burden should be applied at the receiving end of
the compensation, to the taxpayer being paid the amounts, not at the corporate or entity level at
a greater cost to investors. Increasing the marginal rates assures that the appropriate party is
paying the tax irrespective of the entity paying the compensation.
247 See sources cited supra note 246.
248 See Kahan, supra note 207, at 1877-78.
249 See id. at 1879-80.
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perform their jobs well to be successful and to maintain their
employment.
Because the tax code provisions have resulted in more compensa-
tion being paid in less conventional ways, such as stock options, share-
holders have had an increasingly difficult time determining exactly how
much executives are paid.250 The difficulty stems from confusion in dis-
closures to shareholders detailing how compensation will be calculated
when paid in the form of stock options, other compensation amounts
being paid based upon performance criteria, and golden parachute pay-
ments with gross-up provisions. While the code provisions presumably
sought to foster greater shareholder participation, they have in fact made
participation more difficult.
If the code provisions are repealed, then perhaps the dynamic be-
tween executives and boards of directors with respect to stock options
will shift. Eventually executives may wish to be paid in cash, which is
more secure than stock options. Directors will no longer be motivated to
offer significantly more value in stock options than cash to the executive,
because either way the compensation will be deductible. As a result,
corporations will return to cash as the primary form of executive com-
pensation. With a return to cash compensation, shareholders will likely
be able to determine what executives are actually being paid and whether
they in fact deserve that amount based on the performance of the corpo-
ration. Furthermore, this will allow corporate compensation to be closer
to on par with the compensation paid to executives in other types of
entities-such as partnerships-which are not subject to these code
provisions.
Congress has failed to rein in executive compensation through the
tax code and the failure resulted in executives receiving even larger
amounts of compensation. Because of the push to performance-based
compensation, corporate behaviors have also become distorted, and
many executives receive stock options as a major part of their compensa-
tion package. Coupled with the stock market boom in the later part of
the 1990s, executive compensation grew to unprecedented levels. More-
over, the disclosure to shareholders of these stock option plans has been
insufficient and opaque. Shareholders have difficulty in determining ex-
actly how much executives were going to get paid. The cost to share-
holders grew as a result of the enactment of §§ 162(m), 280G, and 4999.
Executives received either the same amounts as they received before or
in most cases greater amounts, and corporations either converted the
compensation to stock options or forwent the deductions. In the case of
§§ 280G and 4999, corporations can no longer take deductions for any
250 See supra pp. 400-04.
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excessive parachute payments and also now pay the penalty taxes on
behalf of the executives. Ultimately, shareholders bear the cost.
In addition, because executive pay is now often based on stock
prices through the use of options, executives are motivated to engage in
activities that serve to increase the stock price of a corporation even if
the effects are merely short-term-allowing the executives to maximize
the value of their stock options. However, the results of the executives'
actions over the long term are often not in the best interests of the corpo-
ration. Therefore, linking executive compensation to stock options can-
not effectuate § 162(m)'s goal of aligning the interests of shareholders
and executives because the motives of the two are fundamentally differ-
ent. Furthermore, linking executive compensation to stock prices has re-
sult in illegal, fraudulent, or unethical behaviors on the part of executives
to inflate the prices of the stock of the corporations they worked for,
ultimately at a much greater cost to shareholders.
Corporations continue to pay executives the amounts of compensa-
tion that they used to pay because that is what the market demands. Cor-
porations, acting in the best interests of their shareholders, seek to hire
the most talented executives they can find. This requires corporations to
pay the market rate for these executives. As a result of the tax provisions
enacted by Congress, the current market rate for executive pay has in-
creased dramatically. Corporations will continue to pay executives sala-
ries comparable to what they might be paid at other corporations.
Congress was shortsighted when it enacted § 162(m). The provi-
sion does not take inflation into account with regard to the $1 million
cap. In addition, by setting a fixed maximum amount of compensation,
Congress overruled the premise that had governed the reasonable com-
pensation jurisprudence under § 162-that the amount of compensation
itself does not necessarily cause compensation to be considered unrea-
sonable.25' Congress fixed the reasonable compensation for publicly-
held corporations (not for other types of entities such as partnerships) at
$1 million. Congress also ignored many of the other traditional factors
deemed critical to the determination of reasonableness, including the
comparable amounts paid to similarly situated executives, the size of the
corporation, and the responsibilities of the executive.
Congress stated that § 162(m) was not intended to supersede § 162
but to add another component to it.252 The question of whether compen-
sation was reasonable still must be answered under § 162, and in no
event can compensation paid by a corporation to certain executives be
251 William S. Gray & Co. v. United States, 35 F.2d 968, 974 (Ct. CI. 1929); see supra
pp. 396-97.
252 See SEN. COMM. R., Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, § 13211, n. 1.
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reasonable if it exceeds $1 million and is not performance-based. 253
However, by disregarding the factors that distinguish various corpora-
tions and imposing a flat rate of acceptable compensation, Congress has
essentially superseded § 162 to the extent that § 162 seeks to regulate
excessive executive compensation.
Congress did try to allow businesses to pay other, more variable
compensation. A business may take into account many of the factors
under § 162, provided the payment of the compensation is performance-
based. 254 However, Congress greatly diminished the utility of the provi-
sion by making a blanket assumption that stock options were perform-
ance-based, it essentially thwarted the utility of the provision. It is true
that stock values can go up as a result of the good performance of an
executive, but stock values can also go up as a result of many other
factors. None of the other variables that affect stock values are taken
into account in the performance-based exception to § 162(m). On the
other hand, an executive can actually perform very well, yet the stock
price can still drop. Again, this is not contemplated in the performance-
based exemption for stock options.
In addition, by selectively applying the limitations to corporations,
Congress is limiting executive compensation in one type of business
while allowing the freedom to set compensation in all other types of
businesses. For example, partnerships are free to set compensation
amounts of their executives at the level that they determine appropriate
without restrictions on deductions.2 55
The intent of the legislation is further defeated by the new forms of
compensation it incentivizes corporations to give to their executives.
Corporate behavior is not being shaped to reduce the amount of compen-
sation paid or link performance when new types of payments are ex-
amined. Many executives now receive massive severance amounts, for
example. Presumably if an executive were being terminated, that execu-
tive had not performed well. If the effect of the legislation were to tie
performance with compensation, there would be no need for these large
severance packages. Yet as mentioned above, these severance amounts
continue to be paid. While the severance packages would not be subject
to §§ 280G and 4999, they would still be subject to §§ 162 and
253 I.R.C. §§ 162, 162(m) (West 2007).
254 Id.
255 See Susan J. Stabile, Viewing Corporate Executive Compensation Through a Partner-
ship Lens: A Tool to Focus Reform, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 153, 228 (2000). In her article,
Stabile argues that partnership executive compensation payment practices may also be applied
to the corporate setting and offered the partnership agreement mode as an "alternative lens"
through which to evaluate executive compensation in public corporations. Id.
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162(m). 256 Severance payments are intended to compensate executives
for the risk of switching jobs, and thus their only connection to perform-
ance might be the executives' performance at their previous employers.
The shareholders have not had the benefit of their good performance, and
yet they are paying the executives for the performance. While these pay-
ments will also be subject to §§ 162(m) and 162, they also continue to be
paid. Even if the payments are ultimately determined not to be perform-
ance-based under the code, the corporations are still making the pay-
ments, and the ultimate cost is borne by the shareholders because of the
lost deductions.
The effects of the tax legislation Congress enacted to rein in exces-
sive executive compensation are not only unintended and contrary to the
legislative purpose but also ineffective. 257 The legislative intent behind
these provisions was to respond to criticism that executive compensation
amounts were too high and to protect the returns of shareholders.
Neither of these goals has been achieved by the provisions. In fact, both
of these goals have been completely thwarted by the actual effects of the
provisions.
B. SOLUTIONS
Some proposals have suggested limiting executive compensation to
some figure based upon the amount that an average worker makes. 258
This is not really any different from the $1 million cap. The amounts
might be different for different corporations, but this could still be sub-
ject to the same types of manipulation used to get around the current
provisions. Corporations could use strategies to inflate the amounts that
average workers are paid or find ways to give equity compensation or
ownership to executives. Corporations could also choose to ignore any
imposed limitations and incur more costs, which would only harm the
shareholders. In addition, because executives make so much more than
an average worker, the limitations would be ineffective unless a massive
pay cut for executives were envisioned.
One has to acknowledge that the nature of the executives' job and
that of many rank and file workers are different. The skill sets and tal-
ents involved are different as well. Perhaps there is a justification for
paying executives the high amounts that they receive. It is in the best
interests of a corporation and the shareholders to hire the best executive
256 It should be noted that severance payments in the form of stock-options would still be
considered performance-based under §§ 162 and 162(m).
257 See Corporate Law Symposium, supra note 127, at 794.
258 See Income Equity Act of 1999, H.R. 740, 106th Cong. § 2(a)(i)(2) (1999) (proposing
a limitation on a corporation's deduction of executive compensation up to twenty-five times
the amount paid to the lowest paid employee in the corporation); Income Disparities Act of
1991, H.R. 3056, 102d Cong. § 2(a)(i)(2) (1991).
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they are able to find for the job. If the justification for paying executives
more is legitimate, then the code provisions enacted are counter-produc-
tive by trying to limit what executives are paid.
Over fifty percent of the American public owns stock, either di-
rectly, through 401(k)-type plans, or other investments. 259 Aiming to get
the best results for these shareholders will help distribute income and
wealth more evenly. Because the shareholders are the owners of the cor-
porations, allowing the shareholders the best possible returns will allow
more corporate profits to be distributed. This may include paying the
market rate for executive talent. The ultimate result of the tax provisions
geared towards controlling excessive executive compensation has actu-
ally placed shareholders in a worse position than before the provisions
were enacted. On the other hand, the government is profiting because of
the additional tax they collect as a result of lost deductions and excise
taxes. Section 162(m) was not intended as a revenue-raising provision,
but at its very best that is all it has accomplished. 260 The shareholders
ultimately bear the costs of these provisions-not the executives or the
corporations who choose to pay the compensation.
Currently-enacted legislation does not adequately address excessive
compensation. Rather, the provisions backfired and resulted in greater
amounts of compensation and greater costs to shareholders and corpora-
tions. Ultimately, corporations determined it was in their best interests to
pay executives more in order to ensure better talent, even if the compen-
sation resulted in greater costs to the corporation and shareholders. To
be competitive and successful, businesses would hire the most talented
executives available for the position. Too many variables and factors
exist to address compensation with one fixed amount. The attempt to
favor stock options was misguided and resulted in more costs to the
shareholders as well as rampant fraud through misstated earnings and
backdating of stock options.
If § 162(m) were repealed, it might result in a return to cash com-
pensation as opposed to stock options. Executives may be willing to be
paid less if they are given the security of cash compensation rather than
stock options. This presupposes that executives actually believe that
stock options are risky. Further, if compensation packages had a larger
cash component, shareholders would be able to have a clearer under-
standing of what the executives are being paid. If the shareholder ap-
proval requirement of § 162(m) was retained, shareholders might be
more likely to act on executive compensation once the amount of the
packages was clearer. In addition, cash compensation better reflects the
different motives of shareholders and executives. While it was idealistic
259 See Hagenbaugh, supra note 43, at IA.
260 See generally Reilly, supra note 197.
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and ambitious to try to align shareholder and executive interests, the real-
ity is that their interests in the corporation differ. Executives do not work
for a corporation for long-term financial growth. Although many would
probably enjoy such growth, it is more likely that executives aim for
shorter-term increases in value to cash out as quickly as possible.261 The
difference in these motives must be acknowledged and not ignored.
Repealing § 162(m) would also remove the incentive for executives
to increase stock prices against the interests of the corporation. The re-
cent wave of corporate scandals have made it apparent that many corpo-
rate executives will seek to increase or inflate stock prices even if it
means engaging in fraudulent or illegal activities. At least part of the
motive to inflate stock prices is that compensation, as a result of
§ 162(m), is tied to stock prices. If executive compensation is tied in-
stead to the performance of the executive through evaluation by the
shareholders and the board of directors, executives may act more will-
ingly in the best long-term interests of the corporation.
Section 162 could be used more effectively to address excessive
executive compensation. Although it has not been typically used to ad-
dress excessive amounts of executive compensation, the tools are availa-
ble. A uniform test could maximize the effectiveness of § 162 when
courts determine whether executive compensation was excessive. An ad-
ditional provision in the regulations or the code providing for a uniform
test would provide this guidance to the courts. For example, a compari-
son of similarly-situated employees in businesses of the same size and
nature, the employee's expertise, time devoted, and importance to the
business would all be critical factors to the determination. A finding as
to the employee's contributions to the business would also be critical.
Finally, the independent-investor test is vital to determining if compensa-
tion is excessive or unreasonable. The ultimate goal of Congress was to
maximize the value to shareholders and protect shareholder returns. The
independent investor test would be the most consistent way to accom-
plish these goals. Section 162 has the potential to successfully regulate
excessive executive compensation if it provides sufficient guidance to
tax payers and courts as to its application.
Furthermore, if shareholders ultimately determine that the corporate
assets are being misused, courts must be responsible for addressing these
concerns. While many state legislatures have created statutes that allow
shareholders to seek recourse if a board of directors is not sufficiently
regulating executive compensation, 262 courts have not always responded
261 See REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORPORATION, supra note 153, at 34
(Comm. Print 2003).
262 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Trr. 8, §§ 124, 327 (2008).
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favorably to such cases. 263 Courts must allow shareholders to monitor
executive compensation whether such cases are brought on the basis of a
breach of fiduciary duty, a breach of the duty of good faith, or the waste
doctrine. While a discussion of these cases and state statutes is beyond
the scope of this paper, the solution to protecting shareholders appears to
lie in allowing shareholders to protect themselves. This is also consistent
with allowing the market to determine executive compensation. If the
system is not working as it should, shareholders should be able to have
redress against those directors who are not doing their jobs.
Many cases have been brought against directors by shareholders for
paying executives excessive compensation amounts, and most of these
cases have failed. Courts hesitate to regulate the market, set a limit for
executive compensation, or interfere in corporate affairs. 26 4 Although
courts have not acted on limiting excessive compensation amounts,
shareholder suits are an appropriate vehicle to address the issue.
CONCLUSION
Congress has determined that excessive executive compensation
was unacceptable and must be remedied. Congress has attempted to reg-
ulate excessive compensation amounts through three provisions in the
tax code: §§ 162, 162(m), and 280G. These provisions limit the amount
of compensation for which a corporation may be allowed to take a de-
duction and impose penalty taxes on executives receiving excessive com-
pensation. These sections have been ineffective because they caused
executive salaries to increase at a greater cost to shareholders. This is in
direct conflict with the legislative intent behind these provisions, which
was to protect shareholders and rein in excessive compensation
packages.
Shareholder returns were not ultimately protected by these provi-
sions because the provisions have often been disregarded by corpora-
tions, resulting in a higher cost to shareholders because of the lost
deductions. Alternatively, corporations have complied with the provi-
sions in order to take a deduction for compensation paid in the form of
stock options. This has resulted in a rise in compensation amounts. In
the case of § 280G, corporations have continued to provide golden para-
chute payments to executives at greater cost to shareholders because
corporations often pay the excise taxes on behalf of the executives. At
the same time, § 280G addresses only golden parachute payments and
263 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (holding that the board of
directors did not breach their fiduciary duty and the payment to Ovitz did not constitute waste
of corporate assets despite the fact that Ovitz received $130 million in severance payment for
fourteen months of service on a five year contract).
264 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1660 (2007).
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not other pay packages that have emerged since its enactment. Presuma-
bly, Congress thought that many of these outlandish severance payments,
if not justifiable, would be addressed by courts through shareholder suits;
however, this has not been the result. Instead, courts have been hesitant
to intervene on compensation matters. 265
Section 162(m) also failed to fulfill its legislative purpose. Section
162(m) sought to reduce excessive compensation by capping the amount
of compensation for which a deduction may be made at $1 million. The
thought was that corporations would limit executive compensation to en-
sure the ability to take the deduction or link compensation to perform-
ance to take advantage of the deduction. In theory this aligned the
interests of shareholders and executives by giving executives a vested
interest in increasing shareholder returns. However, corporations often
choose to forgo the deduction and compensate executives in excess of $1
million in order to retain the best talent. The inability to take a deduction
means additional costs for shareholders.
Connecting executive compensation to performance of the execu-
tive and the corporation did not result in aligning the interests of share-
holders and executives. Because the Treasury regulations specifically
stated that stock options were an acceptable method to link executive
compensation and performance, many corporations attempted to comply
with § 162(m) by converting compensation from cash to stock options.
The reality is that stock options are not an appropriate way to align those
interests. While both shareholders and executives would like to see the
corporation become more profitable, executives prefer short-term
growth, which allows them to cash in their profits sooner, while share-
holders prefer long-term growth. This misalignment resulted in both the
ineffectiveness of § 162(m) and a direct conflict with the intent of
Congress.
Rather than aligning the interests of executives and shareholders,
the grant of stock options often resulted in executives engaging in risky
behaviors to increase the price of the stock to maximize their compensa-
tion. It further encouraged some executives to engage in fraudulent or
illegal activities to garner even greater compensation. In the wake of
recent scandals, this is clearly not in the best interests of the shareholders
who ultimately have to pay for the behavior of the executives. For exam-
ple, the corporation's stock may decrease in value in the long run be-
cause of the executives' risky behavior. This loss would be born by the
shareholders while executives can still collect their compensation by
cashing in their stock options quickly regardless of the long-term loss to
the corporation.
265 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 745-49 (2005).
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Although well intentioned, §§ 280G and 162(m) appear to have
been misguided when consequences of the provisions are examined in
hindsight. The provisions failed to reduce costs to shareholders or align
the interests of shareholders and executives. Instead, the provisions re-
sulted in greater costs to shareholders and behaviors of executives that
put shareholder returns at greater risk. Therefore, these provisions
should be repealed.

